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Executive summary
This interpretative phenomenological research focuses on youth-led companies offering digital services to the agro-
food sector in West Africa. Youth is considered as per the African Union definition: individuals aged between 15 and 
35 years old. Our research questions were to understand the business models adopted by these start-ups; how their 
business models and business model innovation lead to business success; other key drivers that can support the 
achievement of  success. With this study, we aim to contribute to the limited existing body of  knowledge on this 
nascent but growing business field in West Africa.
Twelve start-ups (anonymised in the report) from seven countries were selected following a non-probability, purposive 
sampling technique, from finalists and winners of  international competitions. We interacted with them via semi-
structured interviews. The qualitative data collected were transcribed, categorised and analysed. The start-ups offer 
services to agro-food customers and the value chain, using tools including mobile phones, drones, e-commerce 
platforms. They deploy different business models, serving business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-customers 
(B2C) clients. Due to their nascent professional maturity, many of  them face challenges (more than seasoned 
entrepreneurs) to achieve business success, in terms of  effective services and sustainable profitability. Key findings 
include the observations that success depends intensely on offering diversified and bundled services, integrating 
digital and non-digital agricultural services. Revenues are effectively derived from businesses and supporting 
organisations rather than from individual farmers. The entrepreneurs should therefore target other value chain 
actors instead of  focusing on the farmer only. Success drivers and constraints relate to funding, key partnerships, 
adequate team and team management, business management skills, business modelling, the policy and business 
environments and the social adoption of  information and communication technology (ICT).
We conclude by proposing recommendations such as promoting role models; facilitating access to funding, 
developing effective digital agribusiness management skills (within start-up teams, in university curricula and in 
incubators/accelerators); promoting an enabling business environment (including adopting tax holidays for start-
ups); developing effective business models, leveraging data-driven services; improving national digital infrastructures 
and agricultural digitalisation. Regional collaboration is an important aspect in these strategies.
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1.  Introduction & Methodology
1.1. Introduction
1.1.1. Digital services for the agriculture sector in West Africa 
West Africa is one of  the five regions of  Africa, integrating 16 countries (such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo) out of  54 on the continent. Its predominantly youthful population (44% below 
15 years old) will reach 388 million in 2020 (AfDB and FAO, 2015). Agriculture is a key social-economic sector of  
the region, contributing on average 35% to its gross domestic product (GDP) (AfDB and FAO, 2015) and conditioning 
the livelihoods of  about 65% of  the labour force, particularly in rural areas (ECOWAS, 2017). It includes sub-
sectors such as livestock, fisheries, crop production and forestry. Its value chain involves activities pertaining to the 
production of  agro-food products, their processing, marketing, trade and consumption. West Africa is the main 
regional agricultural power of  Africa: it contributes to 30% of  the continental agricultural GDP (ECOWAS, 2015). 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) posits that agriculture is the first sector 
that will readily provide job opportunities to millions of  African youth facing employment issues (OECD 
Development Centre, 2018). Agribusiness is considered as a strong avenue that fosters growth and wealth creation 
in Africa in general (Yumkella et al., 2011). 
It is acknowledged that one of  the factors contributing to the modernisation and a better performance of  the agro-
food industry is the adoption of  digital information technologies (World Bank, 2017; Walter et al., 2017). Digital 
technologies currently in use in the agro-food sector include primarily the mobile phone, digital radios, satellites, 
drones (CTA(c), 2016) and social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc. They have now 
penetrated all segments of  the agricultural value chains in West Africa, from pre-production to commercialisation 
and consumption. 
Motivated by the promises of  digital tools for the modernisation of  the agro-food sector, despite their limitations 
(World Bank, 2017) and by the business opportunities that their use could generate (Baumüller, 2015), many young 
software developers and entrepreneurs have entered into it (CTA(a), 2016). However, most of  them are facing 
serious challenges to grow their businesses and offer sustainable value to the agricultural sector (Kieti and Crandall, 
2013; Baumüller, 2016; CTA(a), 2016). The entrepreneurs seem to be confronted not only to difficulties relating 
to the business environment in which their companies operate, but also to business model challenges.
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In general terms, a business model is an organisation’s proposal on how to create values and achieve profit (Magretta, 
2002; Afuah, 2003). The concept according to Fengyang and Ates (2017) was initially described in 1957 by Bellman 
et al. (1957) as a “blueprint of business game” based on a mathematical simulation method for business operations. 
Business models were initially restricted to the ICT sector where they were used as a means to map out business 
processes and offer new services (Doleski, 2015). An integrated business model covers and addresses many aspects 
of  the business including different phases of  production, socio-cultural, legal, technological and ecological issues 
needed for the consideration of  a successful business venture. 
In the report, we use the term start-up as defined by Eric Ries (2011): “A start-up is a human institution designed 
to deliver a new product or service under conditions of extreme uncertainty”. We recognise that this definition 
is not exclusive to digital companies but has been used mostly referring to them. In addition, though there is no age 
feature in the definition, the term is used mostly to refer to companies that are young with an ambition to achieve 
high growth. 
© SPC and CTA
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1.1.2. Purpose and motivation
The purpose of  our research project is to study key success drivers and the business models of  young digital start-ups 
servicing the agro-food sector in West Africa. We would like to better understand how digital technology start-ups 
led by young entrepreneurs can offer more effective services. Considering the strategic importance of  agriculture in 
this region, we would like to contribute to devising strategies relating to how it can better benefit from digital 
business services, for a higher performance and for increased food security and growth. 
Our focus on young entrepreneurs is motivated by our wish to contribute to strategies for job creation for youth, a 
critical issue in African countries (African Development Bank, 2016). We have selected West Africa due the fact that 
little university research has been carried out so far on digital agribusiness in that region, compared to East Africa 
for example. We will concentrate on start-ups led by entrepreneurs aged between 18 and 35 years old, which is the 
age range of  youth as defined by the Economic Community of  West African States (ECOWAS), the main West 
African political bodies and the African Union, the main African governmental body (African Union, 2006).
1.1.3. Research questions 
We have identified three main research questions:
• What are the business models adopted by young digital start-ups servicing the agro-food sector in West Africa?
• How do the business models and business model innovation lead to success for digital agricultural start-ups?
• What are other key drivers that can support the achievement of  success by these young digital start-ups? 
1.1.4. Structure of the report
After this introductory and methodological chapter, Chapter 2 will present insights from the literature on issues to 
be investigated by the research, particularly business models, business success and issues relating to youth 
entrepreneurship in agriculture in West Africa. Chapter 3 will decipher the business models of  the companies 
selected using an adapted version of  the Business Model Canvas; analyses of  the relationships between these 
business models and success achievement will follow. Chapter 4 will concentrate on understanding the motivation, 
the success drivers of  the entrepreneurs as well as constraints they face to achieve success. We will conclude with 
Chapter 5 by summarising findings and providing recommendations to relevant stakeholders. References will close 
the report.
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1.2. Methodology
1.2.1. Sample selection
For the purpose of  this study, we have decided to use the purposive sampling technique. Founders of  twelve young 
West African digital agro-food start-ups have been interviewed. They have been selected from best young 
entrepreneurs identified by the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA) through activities 
it has been implementing for more than six years. These activities were public technology competitions (called Pitch 
AgriHack) and a call for participation (Plug and Play) open to all young businesses offering digital technology 
agricultural services in the regions covered. These activities involved about 500 young businesses. The twelve 
participants interviewed are winners (5) or finalists (4) of  the Pitch AgriHack competitions; one was a winner of  
another competition organised by CTA and the African Development Bank; another one was selected as participant 
in CTA’s Plug and Play activities and also won other international awards; and the last start-up won an international 
competition organised by the multinational Rolex and was involved in CTA’s activities as well.
Profiles of the start-ups selected
Twelve start-ups from seven West African countries were selected. Those interviewed are the main founders 
and CEOs of  their companies and are aged between 23 and 36 years old (two founders informed later that 
they are 36 years old, just beyond the 35 years limit we set initially). Table 1 shows the company name (all 
names have been anonymised in line with research regulations of  the Strathclyde University), age of  the 
founder, country of  operation, year the business was started, current number of  staff  and the type of  business 
entity. All these entrepreneurs have started their businesses right from the beginning with the use of  personal 
funds or grant money from local or international organisations and prize money awarded. Six start-ups (Sera, 
AcornTech, Agromarket, etc.) have their businesses registered legally as a limited liability company. At least 
one of  them, Titan.tg from Togo, is a single person limited company; one is a sole proprietorship (Botanica) 
and others are like a cooperative (AgComm, etc.), Most of  the companies pay around 25% corporate income 
tax (such as Connecticut and Sera). In contrast, two (out of  four) of  the Ghanaian companies interviewed 
declared they enjoy corporate tax holiday offered by governments to young start-ups though they pay social 
taxes (for staff  notably). The turnover in 2018 for these start-ups varies from US$ 14,000 to beyond 
US$ 500,000. 
All the anglophone young entrepreneurs interviewed are educated with varying university/college degrees 
such as computer science (Hectare, FoodRecon), agricultural science (Agromarket, Connecticut), agricultural 
extension and management (AcornTech), accounting and finance (MobileTrac). Also, the francophone 
entrepreneurs (main founders) have formal education and training varying from management, information 
and communication (Titan.tg), computer and application design engineering (AgComm), communication 
and business management (Botanica) and agronomy (Franco Sarl).
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Exchanges with two experts
Two non-youth stakeholders were interviewed to understand their perspectives on the research issues. 
The two experts we selected are D.A., who launched early 2000 one of  the first companies that has offered 
digital agriculture solutions in Africa (the company is still operational), and M.B., manager of  a centre that 
supports young entrepreneurs. 
Table 1: Summary table showing details of entrepreneurs interviewed
Company Country Key activities of the start-up Age range of interviewees
Start of 
business Number of staff
Sera Ghana Facilitates delivery of animal vaccines via digital platforms 34 to 40 2016 15 permanent staff
Agromarket Ghana e-Commerce platform for fresh food  25 to 29 2016
6 permanent staff  
and 2 interns
Connecticut Ghana
Agriculture advisory information, 
access to market, sells inputs 
using digital technologies and 
offers other services to value 
chain actors
 25 to 29 2011 40 permanent and temporary staff
MobileTrac Ghana Facilitates access to tractors using digital tools  34 to 40 2016 7 permanent staff
Hectare Nigeria
Rents farmlands to farmers as 
well as digital tools for 
productive activities; 
crowdsource funds (off and 
online) for farm productions
30 to 34 2017 5 permanent staff,  30+ temporary staff
AcornTech Nigeria
Various digital services to 
agriculture stakeholders, 
including an app for advisory 
services; pilots an input 
management platform 
 30 to 34 2016 6 permanent staff
FoodRecon Nigeria
e-Commerce platform selling 
food products at low price 
before end of shelf-life by 
collaborating with food 
producers  
 30 to 34 2016
7 full time employees, 3 
part time staff and 
volunteers
AgComm Senegal
e-Commerce platforms for 
processed food produced by 
women; offers other digital 
services
 30 to 34 2014 5 staff
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Titan	tg Togo
Advisory information, 
marketplace, data management 
platform, etc	
30 to 34 2016 12 permanent staff
Amber Burkina Faso
e-Commerce platform; agriculture 
learning tool using a mobile app
30 to 34 2015 7 permanent staff
Botanica Benin
e-Commerce platform for organic 
agriculture products
25 to 29 2016 7 permanent staff
Franco Sarl Côte d’Ivoire
Production management; use of 
drones to provide advisory 
services
25 to 29 2016
9 permanent and 3 
part-time staff
1.2.2. Data collection and analysis techniques
Fifteen invitations were sent; twelve start-ups were available in the timeframe of  the research. The list of  interview 
questions was prepared to address our research questions and to fulfil the purpose of  carrying out this research. 
Mostly, the questions were generated building on findings of  the literature review, also addressing aspects that 
cannot be answered by the existing literature and the available secondary data. Questions were split into three main 
categories:
• Profile of  the interviewee and background on the company
• Business model 
• Business environment, success drivers and constraints.
Each interview took around 90 minutes. The same questions were asked to all participants to enable comparison. 
Before and after the interviews, we were able to consult relevant secondary data obtained from CTA to gain 
additional understanding of  the interviewees’ business operations.
A major limitation in interpretive analysis of  semi-structured interviews is the precision in capturing responses 
(Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008). This was overcome by using the Skype audio recorder with permission by the 
interviewee so as to minimise errors in the transcribed responses. 
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2. Literature review
We will first question the concepts of  business success and success drivers (many authors refer to success factors, while 
talking about drivers); this will be followed by an exploration of  what the business model concept embraces as well 
as its possible articulations. Thirdly, we will review the concept of  entrepreneurship and some of  its key forms 
relevant for this work: agripreneurship (agricultural entrepreneurship) and digital entrepreneurship in West Africa.
 
2.1. Business success and success drivers
2.1.1. What is success in business?
Financial indicators
From the point of  view of  economists and of  managers, success for a business is defined exclusively, or primarily 
by financial indicators (Meskendahl, 2010). The most common financial indicators referred to are growth, profit and 
turnover (Maltz et al., 2003; Walker and Brown, 2004), while others cited include market share, market capitalisation, 
the number of  employees and efficiency. Financial measures appear to be “hard” and consist of  objective figures 
(Walker and Brown, 2004). Shenhar and his colleagues postulated that the prominent consideration of  financial 
measures as success indicators was probably understandable during “the industrial age during which single-products 
were generally produced…with high variable costs…[but this] does not fit well with today’s dynamic markets, multiproduct 
firms, and high fixed cost environments” (Shenhar et al., 2001).
Financial indicators are generally short term based, produced often on a quarterly basis, mainly to serve the interest 
of  short term investors. When considering technology businesses, Dvir and Shenhar argue that for technology-
based businesses, appraising success by considering financial short term indicators such as profit is usually irrelevant, 
as for many of  these types of  companies, success is achieved in the long term (Dvir and Shenhar, 1992). A good 
example is the online retailer Amazon. In an article with a very expressing title (“The Amazon era: no profit, no 
problem”) Markhan reminded us that after 20 years of  existence and despite having a market capitalisation close to 
US$ 500 million, Amazon reported profits only for a couple of  quarters up to November 2017 (Markhan, 2017). 
Therefore, profitability for technology companies is not necessarily a good success measure in the short term. 
The technology industry grows very quickly and experiences change very often. Constant investment is therefore 
needed (Dvir and Shenhar, 1992). 
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Non-financial indicators
The pre-eminence given to financial measures, especially to profitability, seems to stem from the assertion posited 
traditionally that the objective of  business is profit making (Drucker, 2008). However, Drucker affirmed that claiming 
this is irrelevant and wrong. For him, the main objective of  business is to create customers, and profit 
is only a “requirement” needed to support the business costs and keep it operational. He proposed that business 
objectives have to be set in key areas including financial and non-financial indicators such as human resources and 
social responsibility (Drucker, 2008). Shenhar and his colleagues concurred that non-financial indicators also define 
success (Shenhar et al., 2001). Non-financial measures may include job satisfaction, personal satisfaction, social 
impact, employee happiness, customer satisfaction (Maltz et al., 2003; Walker and Brown, 2004), caring about 
the environment and social responsibility (Drucker, 2008).
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Business success can thus be defined as “the creation or development of an economic activity that generates recurring income, 
generates value and increases a form of well-being for society or well-being at work for the owners, entrepreneurs and human 
capital, over time” (Fassi, n.d.) – sentence translated from French. Though this definition does not mention “customer 
satisfaction” (one of  the key measures of  success referenced in the literature), it is one of  the most relevant definitions 
of  business success we have come across.
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A multidimensional concept
A conclusion from these findings is that there are many ways in which business success is defined. Walker and Brown 
posit that owners of  lifestyle businesses consider successful business performance from non-financial perspectives 
(Walker and Brown, 2004), contrarily to growth-minded businesses. For the first ones, high businesses growth is 
not the main motive (Morrison, 2006). Several authors have developed multi-dimensional approaches of  business 
success such as the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1996) and the Dynamic Multi-dimensional 
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Figure 1: Twelve baseline measures of business success (Maltz et al	, 2003)
Shonesy and Gulbro specified that there is no generally accepted list of  parameters that can help distinguish a 
successful from a failed business (Shonesy and Gulbro, 1998). In addition, success parameters differ per type of  
business (small or large, lifestyle or growth-minded, etc.). 
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2.1.2. Success drivers relevant for this research
A synthetic view of  success for small businesses is offered by Javed Jasra and his colleagues who studied small 
businesses in Pakistan (Jasra et al., 2011). They suggested seven categories of  “determinants” of  success for 
small businesses displayed in the graph below:
Figure 2: Success determinants for small businesses (Jasra et al	, 2011)
Business plan relates to business model in this context. Another researcher identified nine critical success factors 
for small businesses in Pacific countries (Attahir, 1995). These factors are: good management, satisfactory 
government support, oversee exposure, level of  education and training, personal quality and traits, prior experience 
in business, access to finance and initial level of  investment, political affiliation, marketing factors.
These two approaches have much relevance to the West African businesses targeted. Indeed, the businesses 
are small, created by young entrepreneurs and the majority of  them have less than five years of  longevity and are 
operating in the least developed countries. Some of  the indicators these authors highlighted (government support, 
entrepreneurship skills, good management, political influences) have been mentioned in many youth entrepreneurship 
publications targeting developing countries (CTA(a), 2016; Kieti and Crandall, 2013; Kew et al., 2015).
For the research, regarding financial indicators, we will be more concerned with the revenue generation and 
profitability. The companies targeted are young, not listed and many rarely capture other financial indicators.
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2.2. Business models
2.2.1. The concept
Doleski (2015) defined a business model as one that “provides a simplified representation of value creation processes, 
functions and interactions for creating customer value, securing competitive advantage and generating revenue”. Business 
models have been substantially associated with the emergence of  online business (Magretta, 2002). Indeed, the 
growth in the use of  the internet has enabled companies to develop various means of  implementing different models 
that affect the way they respond to the changing business environment.
The concept of  the business model is divided by Afuah (2003) into four main categories (Figure 3). Operations 
within these categories contribute to overall competitive advantage. According to Slávik and Bednár, this model 
lacks in the area of  connecting intrinsic elements of  the business as well as the external environment into a systematic 
flow (Slávik and Bednár, 2014).
Figure 3: Components of business model by A	 Afuah (Slávik and Bednár, 2014)
Johnson and his colleagues describe a profitable company as one which provides value for customers while making 
profit and using a business model comprising of  four related elements: value for customer, profit formula, 
key resources and key activities (Johnson et al., 2008). A prominent principle for achieving success is the right alignment 
of  resources, e.g. brand image, technologies with company activities, e.g. staff  training and production.
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2.2.2. The Business Model Canvas
The most widely tested and used framework of  analysis of  business models appears to be the Business Model 
Canvas (BMC) developed by Osterwalder and Pigneur (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010). The visual representation 
of  all components, their interconnectivity (Figure 4) and its presentation in a 1-page format are some of  its key 
features. The BMC is described as having nine distinctive constituents as shown in the figure below (Slávik and 
Bednár, 2014). Other advantages of  this model are the ease of  use and adaptability within different industries such 
as Apple, Deloitte, Ericsson and government services (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010). We use an adaptation of  this 
model in our study.
Key              
partners
Key               
activities
Value            
propositions
Customer       
relationships
Customer      
segments
Key              
resources
Channels     
Cost structure                                       Revenue streams                                  
Figure 4: The visualisation tool of the BMC by Osterwalder and Pigneur (Slávik and Bednár, 2014)
a) Customer segments
Customer segments define who the target markets is or are. They may be grouped or refined into several groups 
based on needs, behaviour pattern, etc. For a business to remain viable, it must demonstrate the ability to satisfy 
the needs of  the customer segment or target market it has identified. This segmentation of  customers can be based 
on needs, distribution channel, means of  communication, level of  profitability and willingness to pay for variable 
offerings. Examples of  such market segments include mass market, niche market, segmented, diversified 
and multi-sided markets (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010).
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b) Value proposition
A value proposition produces a unique benefit to the customer and allows for customer loyalty. It may be represented 
in a variety of  ways: qualitative or quantitative but with distinctive features and attributes that cannot be easily 
copied by competitors. A “Unique Value Proposition is a single, clear compelling message that states why you are different 
and worth buying” (Blanke, 2013). It may be characterised in the form of  performance, customisation, brand, price, 
bespoke design, accessibility, risk reduction and convenience or usability (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010). 
Value proposition addresses the needs of  a particular customer segment. This component in the BMC framework 
may address as well the need or problem faced by the client and for which a company develops a solution.
c) Channels
A company’s channels describe the ways and manners in which it conveys and interconnects its value proposition 
to its customer segments. Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) propose five different phases in which an effective channel 
can be fulfilled. A business can choose any means depicted in the diagram below to reach its customers or a mixture 
of  both partner or owned channels.
d) Customer relationships
This block represents the relationships the business has with the different customer segments which could 
be computerised (automated services), personal, self-service, through local or online communities or a blend of  one 
or more of  these components (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010).
e) Revenue streams
Revenue streams depict the income received from serving each customer segment (revenue minus cost equals 
earnings). A business must figure out to an extent what value of  services or product a customer segment is willing 
to pay for. Knowing this would determine the pricing strategy which could be used for each segment. Osterwalder 








This element of  the BMC describes vital assets needed for the business to work. Every business needs key resources 
to generate value, reach the desired customer segment and maintain customer relationship while creating revenue. 
These resources may vary as a result of  the sort of  business, e.g. monetary (cash and credit), intellectual (brands 
and patents), physical assets (building, manufacturing facilities and machines) and human resources.
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g) Key activities
Like with the key resources, key activities identify the vital things a business needs to do for the business to work. 
These are the actionable things a business must satisfy to remain viable. They are business specific and vary from 
business to business.
h) Key partnerships
Key partnership involves the web of  suppliers and partners that the business needs to be successful. Alliances 
between businesses are becoming a norm in this age and time because it enables the organisation to gain more 
economic ground, creates better risk management by reducing uncertainty within the business and facilitates 
the acquirement of  resources.
i) Cost structure
The cost structure describes the overall cost of  running a business model. Every segment of  the business model 
acquires a cost. While some businesses are entirely cost-driven (e.g. low-cost airlines, like Ryanair), most businesses’ 
cost structures are found in between the two extremes of  cost-driven and value-driven (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 
2010). There are other features of  cost structure that need to be considered in every business such as fixed costs, 
variable costs, economies of  scale and economies of  scope (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010).
Adaptation of the Business Model Canvas
Some authors point out that the BMC has the disadvantage of  not allowing a detailed account of  the business 
strategy or methods of  emerging into a new market (Howell et al., 2018). However, considering that it has been 
developed as a tool that can readily describe the main aspects of  the business growth engine of  companies, it can 
be understood that it cannot cover everything. 
The BMC has also been adapted by many professionals to better fit different types of  businesses. Ash Maurya 
argued for example that this model is more relevant for more mature businesses that have already identified their 
business models than for young businesses that are still testing their business model hypotheses (Maurya, 2012 (a)). 
He proposed another framework called the Lean Canvas Model, which builds on the BMC and is composed of  the 
following nine components: problem, customer segments, solution, value proposition, unfair advantage, key metrics, 
channels, costs, revenue streams. He highlighted that the “problem” component is a key one for young (digital) 
businesses, as they need to clearly identify a specific problem for which they are developing a specific solution, 
in order to ensure “problem/solution fit” and eventually “product/market fit” and growth (Maurya, 2012 (b)). 
We will take into account Ash Maurya’s arguments in the adaptation of  the BMC that we will use later in this report.
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2.2.3. Business Model Innovation
Business model innovation (BMI) has grown consistently within the past decade within management and 
practitioners. Current reviews of  the terminology that was once known only as business models (BMs) has emphasised 
its importance in today’s business world including such areas as strategy management and technology (Zott et al., 
2011). Many of  such few available reviews refer to BMI as a means of  value delivery and “capture mechanism” 
within a firm (Foss and Saebi, 2017). It denotes a new terminology that offers an overall view of  an organisation’s 
innovation strategy thereby improving the performance of  both pioneering and established firms.
From the literature, there is a significant difference in BM and BMI as the latter has only become recognised 
in recent years and is less understood. The difference lies in the introduction of  innovation within a business model 
which addresses issues such as factors that enable or limit its implementation and how the BM can be used to achieve 
a competitive advantage. BMI can be defined as “designed, novel, nontrivial changes to the key elements of a firm’s 
business model and/or the architecture linking these elements.” (Foss and Saebi, 2017). Thus, the ability 
of  an organisation to move quickly into innovative business models contributes to the overall success and 
sustainability of  the firm.
BMIs are alleged to bring about higher business revenues compared with BMs (Zott et al., 2011). BMIs can 
be categorised into four different patterns as shown in Figure 5.
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Some authors hypothesise that at least two components in the current BM must innovatively change before we talk 
about business model innovation (Lindgardt et al., 2009). Therefore, Geissdoerfer et al. define business model 
innovation as “the conceptualisation and implementation of new business models which can comprise the development of 
entirely new business models, the diversification into additional business models, the acquisition of new business models, or the 
transformation from one business model to another.” (Geissdoerfer et al., 2018).
It has become necessary for firms not to act autonomously but cooperatively with two or more firms and stakeholders. 
BM and BMI are being used as a planning tool that considers and analyses these concerted ventures in promoting 
value and business success (Bocken et al., 2014).
Literature review
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2.3. Entrepreneurship, agripreneurship and   
 digital entrepreneurship
2.3.1. Youth entrepreneurship in West Africa   
as a development strategy
The Oxford English dictionary defines an entrepreneur as a ‘‘person who sets up a business or businesses, taking on financial 
risks in the hope of profit’’ (Jeffrey and Dyson, 2013). A major element in this definition is the ability to take risk 
associated with a degree of  discernment. One could argue that whilst much of  the literature in recent times 
in countries in the north (e.g., Europe, USA) focuses on elite business entrepreneurs, many people in West Africa 
engage in different categories of  business enterprises; they take on risks with the view of  providing a reasonable 
income to cater first of  all for their immediate families and communities (Jeffrey and Dyson, 2013). 
Youth entrepreneurship in West Africa is usually a response to the difficult economic climate in the country and the 
inability to find skilled labour after completion of  a formal degree in a higher institution (Chigunta, 2017). Young 
people in West Africa have been caught up in daunting unemployment and underemployment issues. While 
the total of  unemployed and people in vulnerable jobs in West Africa is huge, youth aged between 15 and 24 years 
old have an employment rate 20% lower than adults’ employment rate (AfDB, 2018). 
Youth are also caught up in the mismatch between job ambitions and reality, and therefore many have escaped 
into various forms of  vulnerable micro-enterprises to survive in an unbalanced economy (World Bank, 2017). 
Entrepreneurship in West Africa is carried out in various business areas (Kew et al., 2015). A notable 
publication on women entrepreneurship in the region is a report by Langevang and Gough (2012) which 
highlights the hairdressing and dressmaking sectors in Ghana dominated by young entrepreneurs. Another 
form of  entrepreneurship in Ghana that has gained support internationally (World Bank, USAID) is the 
Health Keepers. This form of  venture encourages the youth to generate income by operating a door-to-door 
micro-enterprise and gaining some sort of  entrepreneurial skills (Dolan and Rajak, 2016). Social relationships 
play a vital role in the understanding of  new venture creation in Ghana and entrepreneurship is developed 
often in a family business perspective (Kuada, 2009).
Entrepreneurship is also very vivid in Nigeria, the first economy of  Africa in terms of  GDP (World Bank, 2018), 
and one of  West Africa’s greatest countries in terms of  huge potential for growth (Dolan and Rajak, 2016). 
Unemployment and under-employment are pervasive, with more than 64 million of  youth unemployed and 1.6 
million under-employed (Awogbenle and Iwuamadi, 2010). The World Bank suggests that young people should 
make a shift from the tightly and compactly packed white-collar work to creating a means of  venturing into the huge 
capitalist economy through the development of  micro-enterprises. (World Bank, 2007). On their side, Awogbenle 
and Iwuamadi have observed the limitations hindering Nigerian youth employment and proposed in their study 
a wake-up call to orientate people particularly in the need to develop a self-employment mentality and assume 
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means of  gaining entrepreneurial training. Similarly, the government of  Nigeria has called for the engagement 
of  entrepreneurs within the agricultural sector as a way of  revitalising the economy which experienced negative 
growth rates recently. There is a huge opportunity for agricultural development in the country, being that 80% 
of  the land is suitable for growing crops (Anon, 2018). Currently however, the main stigma is that agriculture 
is viewed by youth (and many parents) as being suitable only for illiterates or locals living within rural villages. Many 
believe that the integration of  ICTs will make agriculture more appealing to young people (AGRA, 2015). 
2.3.2. Agripreneurship
Agripreneurship is a terminology which combines agriculture and entrepreneurship. An agri-entrepreneur 
(agripreneur) can be defined according to Ndedi and Feussi (2017) as a person who has discovered an underserved 
or unserved market within the agricultural sector and pursues it despite the risks involved. The paper proposes that 
effective traits of  an agri-entrepreneur include market orientation, creativity and leadership skills. The term has 
been adopted by international institutions and governments in Africa, such as the International Institute for Tropical 
Agriculture (IITA), one of  its most active promoters, particularly through the IITA agripreneurship programme. 
The concept of  agripreneurship is perceived as dynamic and youthful (Ndedi and Feussi, 2017). People engaged 
in agripreneurship are expected to be more “entrepreneurial” (than the regular farmer), very dynamic and to be 
fuelled by a desire to offer innovative business services and grow their offerings. We will often use the concept “digital 
agripreneurs” in this study to refer to digital entrepreneurs serving the agricultural sector. 
Agricultural entrepreneurs are faced with similar challenges as entrepreneurs in other sectors of  the economy. 
They need to deal with areas of  the business such as human resources, financial management and finding/using 
current and detailed information where necessary. Therefore, management skills required for a successful agripreneur 
must include risk management and be able to recognise new opportunities (McElwee, 2006).
2.3.3. Digital entrepreneurship
Understandings of the concept
The increased democratisation of  the internet, the mobile phone and social media (Solis, 2011), as well as 
developments in data processing techniques (such as big data or artificial intelligence) and the evolutions in 
hardware engineering, have led to the emergence of  a new kind of  entrepreneurship named digital entrepreneurship 
(Nambisan, 2017). It may be defined as an engagement in an entrepreneurial project implemented largely 
in the digital space or leading to the delivery of  digital artefacts. A specific form of  this new entrepreneurial avenue 
is digital technology entrepreneurship. Giones and Bren define digital technology entrepreneurship as an 
entrepreneurial venture in which the product and services are exclusively ICT-based, meaning that the output 
is technological (Giones and Brem, 2017). Digital entrepreneurs who are not technology entrepreneurs just 
use technology as inputs.
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Figure 6: Distinction between technology entrepreneurship, digital entrepreneurship and digital technology entrepreneurship 
Source: Giones and Brem, 2017 
Technology entrepreneurship is an under-researched field at the global level, including thus in developing countries 
(Shane and Venkataraman, 2003). 
Roja and Nastase identified several key elements of  the entrepreneurial ecosystem for technology businesses, 
including universities, other businesses, financial service providers, markets, governments, and innovations and 
business development institutions such as technology incubators, accelerators and hubs (Roja and Nastase, 2014). 
The government’s role is to facilitate the existence of  an enabling business environment, while universities, 
innovation hubs and technology parks are the realms of  the development of  innovations (Jiménez and Zheng, 2018; 
Kieti and Crandall, 2013). Developing business management acumen in technology entrepreneurs is a critical 
success condition (Roja and Nastase, 2014). 
This research will in majority involve digital technology entrepreneurs (specialists of  digital technology) servicing 
the agro-food sector but also agricultural entrepreneurs that are using digital technologies innovatively to service 
the sector. The latter are not technology specialists. 
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Digital agripreneurship in Africa
Digital entrepreneurship in agriculture in Africa emerged in the early 2000s. In Senegal, for example, 
the company Manobi Senegal launched in September 2001 SMS-based market information services, targeting 
fishermen, in collaboration with the national telecom operator Sonatel (BBC, 2002). The services aimed 
at providing fishermen with current market information prices and trends before they sell their produce to the right 
buyers. Fishermen were not requested to pay for the services, but Manobi was paid commissions from Sonatel based 
on the communication traffic generated by the use of  the service (Sylla, 2008). With the reduction of  internet and 
mobile communication costs over the years coupled with the higher penetration of  digital technologies 
in the agriculture sector, consumption of  digital agricultural services is much more common (CTA, 2014). Therefore, 
entrepreneurial activities in this field have spurred, driven by young entrepreneurs encouraged by various institutions 
(Baumüller and Lohento, 2016).
However, many of  these youth-led technology start-ups are facing serious challenges to sustain their businesses 
and offer sustainable value to the agricultural sector. Referring to the case of  East Africa, Kieti and Crandall 
affirmed that “these start-ups face issues of marketing their products to farmers, finding funding to scale their products, and 
ensuring they are properly meeting the needs of their end users” (Kieti and Crandall, 2013). The start-ups are particularly 
facing challenges relating to how to design effective business models, which will ensure repeat customer purchase, 
higher revenue generation, profitability and scalability (Elliott, 2015). A fundamental issue which is a constraint the 
entrepreneurs have to take into account, is that farmers in most cases in Africa are poor, digitally nearly illiterate 
(though they can use the mobile phone), and usually unwilling to pay for information services. The effectiveness at 
a larger scale (past the pilot experience) of  digital information services targeting agriculture is also in many cases 
questionable (Baumüller, 2015) and may prevent sustainable business service offerings. 
In many cases, the usefulness of  digital services for the farmer-customer depends on structural intrinsic 
challenges that the agricultural sector is facing that limit severely the effectiveness of  applying digital technologies 
(Baumüller, 2015). Another fundamental issue undermining the development of  start-up services is the weak 
management capacities of  young entrepreneurs themselves (CTA, 2017; Roja and Nastase, 2014).
2.3.4. Supporting the development of youth  
entrepreneurship
In the past decade, youth entrepreneurship has been particularly drawn to lime light in the race for employment 
creation and economic growth in developing countries (AGRA, 2015; Kew et al., 2015). The increasing population 
of  the youth has been seen as a huge reservoir of  untapped potential and as a risk for social unrest in face of  harsh 
economic conditions. A large variety of  initiatives (such as programmes dubbed “bottom of  pyramid” initiatives 
(Dolan and Rajak, 2016) are put in place by government parastatals, private bodies and international NGOs, 
at national and international levels to address youth development (AGRA, 2015; ITU, 2014; OECD, 1998). 
Many of  these initiatives aim at preparing the youth to be aspiring business entrepreneurs in the fight against 
poverty and view themselves as a means of  increasing the economic power within the society. 
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Many youth innovations are emerging such as those produced by Safi Sarvi which deals with the production 
of  organic fertiliser in Kenya and the innovative UMT (malaria testing device) developed by some Nigerians 
(Ekekwe, 2016). Other examples of  such cases are noted in the report by Chimub and Nayamanhindi (Chimub 
and Nayamanhindi, 2012) which highlights mobile phone micro-ventures of  youth in Zimbabwe and another 
report focusing on youths in Nairobi (Kenya) who have derived a means of  livelihood from recycling waste (Thieme, 
2010). Some studies have looked at the promotion of  youth entrepreneurship in universities materialised by 
the development of  “student spin-off  companies” (Bezerra et al., 2017). 
The advent of  digital technology has supported the growth of  youth entrepreneurship possibilities (ITU, 2014). 
The use of  internet, the cloud, social media and freely available software has increased the innovation process 
and the emergence of  innovations by young entrepreneurs within the society (CTA(a), 2016). 
Amongst other difficulties in entrepreneurship, the young entrepreneurs possess further challenges due to their age. 
These include lack of  experience and professional businesses training, inability to get funding due to the lack of  
financial credibility and human resources (Borges et al., 2012).
Many of  the studies and reports referenced above have called for support to help youth achieve successful 
entrepreneurship, including in the agricultural sector, as an avenue to address employment issues they are facing 
but also to leverage their innovations to achieve national growth. At the same time, many authors warn that not 
everyone can become an entrepreneur or a successful entrepreneur (Kew et al., 2015; Global Entrepreneurship 
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3. Business model analysis
3.1. Detailed presentation of start-ups’  
 business models
For the analysis of  the business models of  the companies targeted, we will use an adaptation of  the Business Model 
Canvas. We have included the “problem” component building on the observation by Ash Maurya that this element 
is very important for describing young businesses (Maurya, 2012 (b)), as we specified in the literature review section. 
The “value proposition” component has been kept, referring expressly to the unique value that infers competitive 
advantage to companies as per the definition of  Blanke (Blanke, 2013). The “customer relationships” component will 
be addressed through the “channels” component, in line with the observation by Maurya that the path to customers 
(channels) gives insights on relationships a company establishes with them (Maurya, 2012 (b)). The components 
adapted are marked in yellow in Figure 7. We have not adopted the full Lean Canvas Model proposed by Maurya 
as an alternative canvas, as we believe that the “key partnerships” and “key resources” (that he removed mainly because 
he wanted to keep a 9-component model of  the BMC) are very important for the agriculture technology start-ups 
we are studying.
Adapted Business Model Canvas for selected 
digital agricultural start-ups studied
Key              
partnerships
Key               
activities






Customer      
segments
Key              
resources
Channels     
(Include as well 
aspects of customer 
relationships)
Cost structure                                        Revenue streams                                  
Note: A couple of  companies are not primarily specialised in digital services. We will not put emphasis on 
agricultural services they offer that do not depend on digital technologies. 
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3.1.1. Problems addressed
The companies interviewed have designed their digital services to address several types of  agricultural 
challenges (see Table 3). These problems are common, not only to the agricultural sector in West Africa, but also 
to Sub-Saharan countries (AGRA, 2018). 
The first three challenges addressed are the weak agricultural productivity, the lack of  advisory services and the lack 
of  access to profitable markets for farmers. These appear to be some of  the most fundamental difficulties 
facing agriculture in West Africa (AfDB and FAO, 2015). Problems relating to weak productivity include the very 
limited access to mechanised services such as tractors, which MobileTrac from Ghana addresses using 
a digital platform. 
Five companies supply solutions to the issues of  limited access to quality agro-food products. Examples include 
Botanica, from Benin, which has as vision to promote agro-ecological products to contribute to fighting climate 
change adverse impacts and to promoting nutrition security:
Women farmers are confronted with daunting problems in their agricultural practices and AgComm from Senegal 
has decided to concentrate their business on women, as shared by the founder:
Apart from supporting women producers, AgComm gives herself  the vision to promote local food consumption; 
indeed reducing food imports, which cost Africa about 35 billion dollars annually, has been identified as a crucial 
continental concern (African Development Bank, 2016).
In Benin, a large share of the chemical inputs, normally reserved for the cultivation 
of cotton, is used by the horticultural sector. In line with the Sustainable 
Development Goals and the ten principles of agro-ecology established  
by FAO, we address the problem of bad production and food supply  
by strengthening the resilience of smallholder farmers and by promoting 
healthy food consumption.”
Botanica’s founder during the interview
We were three women who came together to develop the platform, initially 
for a competition. After the competition, we decided to refocus on the crucial 
challenges faced by women producers, especially women agro-food processors. 
A large share of rural women is involved in small-scale farming and in 
agricultural trade, but they are facing dramatic problems and weak revenues.”
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Table 3: Problems addressed by the start-ups
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Four companies, including Connecticut and Titan.tg (promoter of  an e-commerce platform, among others), have 
identified the limited use of  ICT for customer data and supply chain management as an entrepreneurial opportunity.
Sera from Ghana addresses the weak access to animal vaccines for livestock farmers; this issue leads to animal 
diseases and deaths depriving farmers from important revenues. Its founder revealed:
Reducing animal and post-harvest losses is thus an important concern for some of  the companies. Apart from Sera 
that fights animal losses, FoodRecon in Nigeria facilitates the sale of  food “approaching end of shelf-life” to charities 
and households with the objective to fight hunger, malnutrition and food losses.
The last type of  problem addressed is the weak access to inputs (seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, agrochemicals, animal 
inputs, etc.). We have considered only start-ups that manage access to inputs with the support of  digital tools. 
We realised that the animal mortality rate was really high in communities.  
A lot of these communities are far from towns, and getting animal health 
care means that they have to constantly look for the vet or the delivery 
provider who would be available; but most often when they call either  
the person lives at far distance or the person is not available.”
Sera founder
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3.1.2. Activities and services
All start-ups studied offer (or are planning to offer in the near future) non-digital agricultural services, either as their 
original revenue stream or as an additional revenue stream. The non-digital services include farm management, 
agricultural production, inputs delivery, extension services, catering services and agricultural training, all offered 
without any, or any substantial ICT support. 
Apart from these non-digital services, various types of  services are supplied by the young companies using digital 
platforms:
• Market linkage services
(By nine companies). We refer here only to outputs market (post-production). The services offered are generally 
of  three types. First, the use of  e-commerce platforms to sell agro-food products to households and individual 
customers. It is an activity of  AgComm in Senegal; Agromarket in Ghana; Titan.tg in Togo; Botanica in Benin; 
FoodRecon in Nigeria. The second type of  market linkage services involves connecting agro-food producers and 
agro-food buyers, using digital trade platforms in this process. Titan.tg (via their activity devoted to e-commerce) 
supplies those services; sometimes, they aggregate commodities purchased from farmers to supply buyers. The 
third type of  services is the collection and dissemination of  market prices for specific commodities. For example, 
Connecticut in Ghana collects and shares agricultural commodity prices to their subscribers through their 
mobile phone messaging services.
• Advisory services
Agricultural advisory services normally involve non-market and market-related services provided to farmers to 
help them successfully engage in agricultural production and achieve higher productivity. For the purpose of  
this research, we have not included market services in the advisory services category. Advisory services offered 
by start-ups include the provision of  agronomic tips, weather information, etc. While these services may be 
delivered without the involvement of  digital tools, three start-ups interviewed supply them through digital tools. 
Connecticut in Ghana provides weather information and agronomic tips to registered farmers in local languages 
through mobile phone and a vocal server. AcornTech from Nigeria has developed a mobile application used 
among others by a Nigerian agricultural research institution to share information to farmers. Titan.tg from 
Togo also disseminates weather information through vocal server or mobile phone.
• Production machinery services
(Many of  these services are also considered as inputs market services, however, we prefer to single them out in 
the framework of  this analysis). Companies identified in this category provide for example tractor services for 
ploughing or drone services for phytosanitary diagnosis, land surveillance, land mapping and agricultural 
product spraying. Examples of  start-ups in this category include MobileTrac that supports the management of  
access to tractors using particularly a mobile phone service and a digital monitoring platform. AcornTech 
developed a web platform (currently in stand-by) to manage access to agricultural machinery.
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Table 4: Services offered by the start-ups
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• Inputs service delivery 
Two start-ups that provide digital services through which inputs (fertilisers, pesticides, etc.) are delivered to 
farmers are Connecticut and Sera in Ghana. AcornTech from Nigeria is also introducing a new package of  
services which will “(…) facilitate management of quality inputs supply, by leveraging technology to combat counterfeit 
agro inputs, ensure compliance to industry standards and provide risk covering support for smallholder farmers.” (CEO of  
AcornTech, Nigeria)
• Customer data and supply chain management
With the increased social penetration of  digital technologies, the development of  the internet of  things (IoT) 
and of  artificial intelligence, data analytics have become a high-value practice that businesses leverage upon to 
acquire, manage and capture value from customers (Loshin and Reifer, 2013). Connecticut is capturing value 
from its customers’ data, using them to provide other services to partners in this area. They have also developed 
a data management platform to assist various institutions to better manage customer data. Titan.tg has also 
developed such a data management platform. Sera, on their side, informed that various organisations are 
interested in their customers’ data; the company might then offer data services in the future. A question that 
remains weakly addressed is how to ensure that farmers’ data are protected and that farmers keep ownership of  
their data (Maru et al., 2018).
• Financial services
Only two start-ups offer financial services powered by digital tools. Farmers in Connecticut’s client base benefit 
from credit inputs and reimburse the costs after harvest. Botanica, which has an agro e-commerce platform, has 
launched an innovative payment tool which integrates a QR code.
• Other services
These include ICT training, website, blog or social media account development for farmer groups and other 
agricultural entities. Several start-ups offer these services as additional revenue streams (AgComm, AcornTech, 
Agromarket, etc.). In many cases, this was not planned and does not constitute the core service the 
company offers.
A final observation: all start-ups investigated offer at least two types of  services (on average four services), while 
Connecticut is the company offering the largest panel of  services by “bundling” them.
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3.1.3. Customer segments
Farmers (young farmers, women producers, small-scale and large-scale farmers) and institutions supporting farming 
(government institutions, international (rural) development institutions, NGOs, etc.) are the customers mostly 
serviced by the companies. Hectare targets young farmers and other youth interested in engaging in farming and 
collaborates with them as employees for its agricultural productions. Small-scale farmers, who made up 70% of  
the population in Sub-Saharan Africa and produce 80% of  the food consumed (AfDB and FAO, 2015; ECOWAS, 
2015) are the primary target clients of  the start-ups. However, individual farmers usually struggle to pay or cannot 
afford services offered.
Franco Sarl even asserted that for now, they do not have farmers or farmer organisations in their customer segments. 
They work directly with institutions that support farmers and farmers benefit via these organisations.
Agro-food businesses may be restaurants, supermarkets or grocery stores; they purchase agro-food products that the 
start-ups sell via their e-commerce platforms for example, or purchase ICT services they offer. For now, e-commerce 
platforms target rather high-end or middle-class citizens who can purchase goods using ICT tools (Facebook Pages, 
WhatsApp, etc.).
Another category of  customers is the “individuals and households” category. It comprises clients of  e-commerce and 
digital marketplaces (put in place by AgComm, Titan.tg, Botanica, etc.). “Individuals” also represent busy 
professionals and other individual “investors” who buy shares of  agricultural production budget from Hectare when 
a production campaign is launched. The “other businesses” category involves firms that sub-contract Franco Sarl 
when they need aerial mapping services while offering services to governments, or international institutions, 
or businesses and supply chain partners that need farmer data (insurance companies, banks, input dealers, etc.) 
from Titan.tg, Sera or Connecticut.
From another point of  view, it is notable that almost all the start-ups offer services both to B2B and B2C clients.
We did a small market research that allowed us to eventually target NGOs 
and associations who can pay for our services; therefore, we have decided  
no more to target the small-scale producers as initially planned.” 
CEO of Amber, Burkina Faso
We target high-end customers and expatriates.”
CEO of Agromarket, Ghana
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Table 5: Customer segments
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3.1.4. Unique value proposition
As per the BMC model (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010), value proposition can be gained with “performance”, 
“brand”, “newness”, “bundled services”, “price”, “risk reduction”, “accessibility”, “convenience” or “usability”. 
All companies claimed to have a competitive advantage with the increased “performance” that their digital services 
provide and with the “newness” of  their digital services. 
The entrepreneurs, especially e-commerce platform operators, also asserted that “accessibility” is a value proposition 
as customers can acquire their products or services from their fingertips (mobile or desktop device) from wherever 
they are. Botanica stated that their payment system confers them a “brand” competitive advantage, and like 
Agromarket, they claimed to provide “risk reduction” with the sale of  agro-ecological products. With their “bundles 
services” (weather, advisory and market information obtained with the sale of  inputs) Connecticut gains considerable 
competitive advantage.
Agromarket selected in addition “price” as value proposition and explained that because they bypass middlemen, 
they can sell at cheaper prices. AgComm also declared that they provide a “brand” value proposition by promoting 
local processed foods produced by rural women cooperatives.
3.1.5. Channels
All start-ups deliver services through their offices, their physical and web sales force. Many use social media 
(especially Facebook, Instagram and increasingly WhatsApp), especially operators of  e-commerce platforms 
(Agromarket, Titan.tg, AgComm, Botanica, etc.). Agromarket, Connecticut and AgComm are the three start-ups 
that use the most social media with their official business accounts. Most start-ups deliver services via mobile 
applications and messaging services.
Not only do we provide 1000 acres farmland for production, but we  
have a fully serviced farm, with access to mechanisation, mentorship, 
access to market and the possibility to apply the right ICT tools  
to maximise production.”
CEO of Hectare
The value we render is in the quality of service (…) Farmers can purchase  
high quality and affordable inputs delivered with free messages of weather  
forecast, financial literacy and information on how to better utilise their  
crops and fertilisers.”
CEO of Connecticut
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The CEO of  FoodRecon noted that mobile apps’ downloads are very low generally, because of  the cost of  bandwidth 
and the weak smartphone coverage in West Africa. Therefore, they do not use their app that much.
One company (Botanica) declared that they have their own stores. Six start-ups use consistently partners as delivery 
channels:
• FoodRecon: customers collect the products directly at supermarkets and food producer stores
• AgComm, Agromarket, Botanica: external logistics services are used when required for delivery
• MobileTrac: they collaborate with tractor owners, who have tractor operators to carry out the harrowing, 
harvesting, ploughing, etc., as required.
We use the mobile messaging technology USSD instead of a mobile app  
so that the rural farmer who has just a feature phone and not a smartphone 
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3.1.6. Key resources
Resources can be categorised in four categories: intellectual, human, monetary resources and physical assets. 
The two key resources that all the companies have are human resources (developers, agricultural specialists 
and other staff) and physical resources (mostly office equipment and other tools such as drones for Franco Sarl). 
Those who are primarily agribusinesses and who engage in agricultural production (such as Hectare and Amber) 
are owners of  farmlands or rent them. Most of  the companies declared not to have monetary resources: four out 
of  twelve are not profitable and those who have already broken even have limited profits. Some have recently 
benefited from important financial resources (such as Sera that raised US$ 300,000 in 2018 or AgComm 
that recently obtained a US$ 100,000 grant). However, they hardly claim they have monetary resources, especially 
if  they are not yet profitable. The intellectual resources that most start-ups have are their digital platforms, which 
have been copyrighted in some cases. None of  them has been able to secure patents because the expensiveness 
of  the process.
3.1.7. Cost structure
As per the BMC model (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010), cost structure may be characterised through the lenses 
of  the importance of  fixed or variable costs for the companies; it may also be characterised by whether the company 
is value-based or cost-driven. 
Generally, the companies interviewed have high variable costs and low fixed costs. Fixed costs are usually related 
to their offices and some permanent salaries. Due to their weak turnover and profitability (eight out of  twelve make 
profits), they operate with very tight salary costs (with several temporary staff, or undeclared staff) and low office 
renting costs. Physical resources to procure or maintain are limited because of  the nature of  the digital business. 
All the start-ups interviewed are value-driven and less cost-driven. For example, the CEO of  MobileTrac mentioned 
during the interview:
3.1.8. Revenue streams
Revenues are generated through the sale of  assets (agro-food products, animal vaccine, crop inputs, etc.) for most 
of  the start-ups (nine out of  twelve). This is followed by usage fees (use of  tractors, software, drones) and licensing 
or renting fees (Connecticut and Titan.tg have licensed their data management platforms). Subscription models are 
used by three start-ups only: Hectare rents land to young farmers who then pay subscription fees; AgComm 
has some subscribed buyers and Botanica has a subscription model via their innovative payment card; this was 
a choice by the company to ensure regular and foreseeable revenues. No start-up (even the e-commerce platform 
operators) uses online advertising as a revenue stream. Some tried but could not find advertisers willing to pay.
We have almost no competitor in Ghana. No other mechanisation company 
uses ICT like us. Traditional service providers want to collaborate with us 
in order to earn more services and revenues. Therefore, we don’t really 
compete on costs.”
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Table 6: Revenue streams
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Regularly, some of  the e-commerce platforms launch special discounts or organise special events to increase 
customer purchases. In December 2018, Agromarket launched a two-week event around Black Friday, offering 
interesting discounts, while AgComm regularly offers special discounts during national holidays and social events.
The median of  the turnover of  start-ups is around US$ 73,000, the average US$ 149,000, the minimum 
US$ 14,000 and the maximum is above US$ 500,000.
Revenues are generated more from the institutions, cooperatives and businesses rather than from individual 
small-scale farmers.
3.1.9. Key partnerships
In order to implement their operations, the youth companies work with various key stakeholders. These include 
government institutions; farmer associations and cooperatives; telecom operators; agro-food businesses; national 
associations and international organisations supporting agricultural development (FAO, CTA, IFAD, AfDB, IITA 
etc.) and logistics firms. Development organisations collaborate with all start-ups providing them with grants, 
consultancy services, facilitating their access to market, or offering them other support. Agro-food businesses 
are those they work the most with, apart from development organisations. Some start-ups have successfully engaged 
in partnerships with governments. For example, Titan.tg is currently supplying services to the government and 
financial institutions in the framework of  an agricultural financial project:
However, most entrepreneurs reported challenges with those stakeholders, particularly governments and telecom 
operators, but also sometimes international organisations and farmer organisations. These challenges will 
be discussed in more detail in the “constraints” section of  the next chapter. Many collaborate with institutions 
supporting (youth) innovations such as incubators and business development services. The latter provide them 
with capacity building for example, but this usually happens before or in the early stage of  the business launch.
90% of our revenue comes from the food companies, exporters, the big 
buyers, the businesses that are working with smallholder farmers.”
Connecticut’s CEO
Our data management platform is used to identify and register farmers, 
which helps them access finance. Banks and insurance companies are 
those who pay for the services farmers benefit from.”
CEO of Titan.tg
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Table 7: Key partnerships
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3.2. Analysis
3.2.1. Synthetic view of the business models
As illustrated above, the companies studied are deploying different types of  business models depending on variables 
such as services, infrastructure used, customers targeted and revenue models. A snapshot of  the ontology 
of  the business models adopted is illustrated below. Items highlighted in bold have been more cited by respondents. 
Presenting the business model typology of  the companies interviewed can provide a practical channel to identify 
and analyse them. However, we have not been able to identify in the literature a business model taxonomy for 
digital agribusinesses. 
Paul Timmers proposed a typology of  business models of  companies active on the internet. It includes the following 
categories: e-shop; e-procurement; e-auction; e-mall; third-party marketplace; virtual communities; value chain service 
provider; value-chain integrators; collaboration platforms; information brokerage; trust and other services (Timmers, 1998). 
As per this classification, the business model types of  the start-ups involved in this research 
could correspond to: 
• Information brokerage (Titan.tg, Connecticut)
• Value chain service provider (Franco Sarl, AgComm, Hectare, Sera, MobileTrac) 
• Value chain integrator (Connecticut, Titan.tg, AcornTech)
• E-shop (Agromarket, Amber, AgComm, Botanica, FoodRecon).
Some start-ups may be included in multiple categories.
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Adapted Business Model Canvas for selected 
digital agricultural start-ups studied
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Figure 8: Snapshot of business models for start-ups studied
2018 turnover between 
US$ 14,000 and more than  
US$ 500,000
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Another classification of  business models, proposed by Michael Rappa, identified the following categories: brokerage 
model; advertising model; infomediary model; merchant model; manufacturer (direct) model; affiliate model; community 
model; subscription model and utility model (Rappa, 2010). The business models of  the start-ups involved in our 
research belong to the following categories as per this model:
• Brokerage model (Titan.tg, Connecticut, MobileTrac) 
• Merchant (Agromarket, Amber, AgComm, Botanica, FoodRecon, Connecticut, Sera)
• Subscription model (Botanica, Agromarket)
• Infomediary model (Connecticut, Titan.tg) 
• Manufacturer (direct) model (Hectare, MobileTrac, Franco Sarl).
Though some of  these categories may be relevant to the digital agribusinesses studied, the models do not help fully 
in defining adequately the companies and offer too much duplication, especially the Rappa model.
We propose another framework of  analysis of  the business models of  the companies in Table 8, leveraging three key 
components of  the BMC (activities/services, customer segments, revenue streams).
• Mass market 1 represents a clientele composed of  the general public interested in agro-food products (that they 
can procure goods for example via e-commerce platforms).
• Mass market 2 represents a customer segment including actors of  the agro-food sector (farmers, extension 
agents, agro-businesses and other professionals). Mass market 2 is smaller than Mass market 1.
• As suggested by Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010), companies addressing a “Multi-sided market” supply two or 
more interdependent customer segments. For example, Connecticut supplies both farmers and agro-food 
businesses with different services.
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Table 8: Synthetic view of the business models of the start-ups
Offering Customers Revenue streams






Sera Inputs management platform Mass Market category 2 B2B and B2C Asset sale
Agromarket Market brokerage services; e-commerce platforms; digital literacy and visibility services
Mass market 
category 1; Mass 
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B2B and B2C




Inputs management platform; market brokerage services; 
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MobileTrac Production machinery management services Niche; Multi-sided B2B and B2C Commission; usage fees
Hectare
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Amber Market brokerage services; e-commerce platforms; digital literacy and visibility services
Mass market 






Botanica E-commerce platforms; agri-financial services Mass market category 1 B2B and B2C
Asset sale/
subscription




B2B and B2C Usage/service fees
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3.2.2. Revenues are generally not generated from  
the individual farmer but from the value chain,  
businesses and supporting organisations
Many entrepreneurs have clearly specified that they do not generate revenues directly from the individual farmers, 
but rather from value chain actors, businesses and farmer supporting organisations. This is a crucial observation, 
common to most start-ups studied. This finding is actually in line with observations by different authors (Baumüller, 
2015; Elliott, 2015; David-Benz et al., 2012, CTA(b), 2016; AGRA, 2016) that farmers are not generally willing, 
or able, to pay for digital services proposed to them. Though in many surveys, they may announce their willingness 
to pay, this does not translate into reality once the service is launched. Almost all start-ups proposing digital 
services (especially advisory services) faced that issue at the launch of  their services and many changed their 
approaches subsequently.
The two CEOs were referring to advisory services they offer (agronomic tips or weather information for Titan.tg, 
and a mobile learning tool on best agricultural practices for Amber). These are the services that suffer the most from 
this situation. As farmers may have alternative sources for advisory information (Lohento, 2003) and as they also 
receive free advisory services from many public institutions such as NGOs or governments (AGRA, 2016), they seem 
not to perceive the financial value of  these start-up services. When stakeholders, especially those at the bottom of  
the pyramid, do not perceive this value, they will not be willing to pay (Howell et al., 2018). In many cases, farmers 
do not understand the value of  the services due to the digital illiteracy they face in Africa in general (Kabbiria et al., 
2018); many refrain from using these services because they perceive that the use of  digital tools is costly. Many 
services are also intended to be consumed via smartphones that extremely few farmers own (Baumüller, 2015). 
It seems that farmers are more willing to pay for inputs and outputs market linkage services as these may lead 
to direct sales for them.
At the beginning we wanted the producers to pay (…) but after processing 
data from a preliminary survey, it was realised that associations and NGOs 
could be a better channel for our service.”
CEO of Amber
People (farmers) wanted to have these services but they were not willing  
to pay for it (...) We understood that individual payments by farmers does  
not work. What seems to work best is when other institutions bear the costs  
of these services.” 
CEO of Titan.tg
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There are four types of  organisations that generally pay for these services for farmers:
• Governments that are supporting farmers as part of  their national food security strategy, and also as they have 
the duty to protect vulnerable citizens which many farmers are
• Well-structured farmer cooperatives that have resources such as cash crop farmer cooperatives
• National or international agricultural development organisations supporting farmers and promoting 
food security
• National or international agribusiness off-takers that source commodities from farmer members of  their supply 
chains and with whom they engage in contract farming (AGRA, 2016; World Bank, 2017).
Value capture can thus better be enabled when start-ups target the value chain and supporting institutions (Howell 
et al., 2018; AGRA, 2016). Many start-ups have learned this through the hard way by facing failures (see quote from 
Titan.tg above and CTA(b), 2016; CTA(a), 2016). 
It is worth mentioning that some start-ups have, right from the start, understood the right customer segment they 
have to address to generate consistently revenues. Franco Sarl from Côte d’Ivoire with their drone services have not 
targeted individual farmers, but rather consulting firms engaged in rural or farming projects funded by government 
or donors, large cash crop producer organisations that can pay, and individual landlords interested in mapping 
services. It is also worth mentioning that some digital services such as e-commerce platforms do not target farmers 
but rather the middle to high-income consumers, nationals or expatriates, restaurants, shops (see services offered by 
Agromarket, FoodRecon, AgComm, Botanica and Hectare). In these cases, revenues are generated more easily, 
though profitability may be constrained by other issues. 
3.2.3. Financial success depends on offering digital  
and non-digital bundled services 
In several publications such as CTA(a) (2016) most youth-led companies introduced were offering only one service. 
For the fact that the companies studied are youth-led and because the business sector is new, there could have been 
an expectation that most of  them would offer only one service. However, in our study, we have found out that just 
two businesses out of  twelve are offering only one service (Agromarket (e-commerce platform) and Sera (delivery 
of  animal vaccines)). All the others have at least two different offerings. This observation might be an illustration that 
there is a growing maturity of  digital agribusinesses in the region.
In fact, our sample is composed of  companies that have achieved some success, as they have been finalists or winners 
of  international competitions. Apart from developing their initial products, they have understood that they still 
have the capacity to develop other product(s) or have identified other customer needs that they have decided 
to serve. This observation is fully in line with suggestions by David-Benz and her colleagues when they studied 
market information systems in Africa, and recommended that there was a need to “strengthen the impacts of the 
information by supplying complementary services to market stakeholders” (David-Benz et al., 2012) – citation translated 
from French.
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Bundling services that farmers are willing to pay with others that they would not readily purchase seems to be a good 
strategy. It is the strategy adopted by Connecticut when they offer free advisory information via mobile phone and 
a voice server to farmers who register and purchase inputs from them. Thus, by integrating non-digital service(s) that 
farmers can easily purchase with digital offering(s) of  which value they may not be prepared to purchase, a company 
can capture value more easily from farmers. In addition, Connecticut provides additional services such as credit 
inputs, which can help them generate more value.
One of  the experts we interviewed confirmed the effectiveness of  this approach of  integrating digital and 
non-digital services, by becoming a value chain player, and recommended that young digital innovators serving 
the agricultural sector should open their minds:
Many of  the start-ups studied have understood this, such as Connecticut:
AgComm has also decided to broaden their identity by referring to their business as “a digital platform for agriculture” 
and no more primarily as an e-commerce platform.
It is worth noting that offering multi-sided or diversified services, thereby becoming a value chain player, can only 
work effectively if  the young company has enough capabilities to fulfil the work implied. 
Especially from the younger generation, there is a confusion between  
the digital expertise and agricultural expertise. What is needed is to strengthen  
the agricultural sector, not to offer a digital service. The supply side is dominated 
by digital expertise as if digital technologies determine the agricultural 
environment and performance. Digital technologies are not an end by themselves.”
D.A.
I wish I knew from the early stage not to only think technology. I was only 
thinking engineer for one year, and that didn’t help us (...) Software is just  
one tool in the box, and I am open to use any other tool.”
Connecticut CEO
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3.2.4. Constant unplanned business model innovation
A clear pattern that has emerged from this research is that business models of  the majority of  the start-ups are 
constantly changing, either because product market fit has failed leading to lack of  adoption of  the solution:
or because new business opportunities have emerged.
From our interactions with the start-ups, seven sources of  opportunities framed their business model innovations: 
customers, business partners, employees, relatives, literature, R&D, and internal knowledge of  the founders.
Franco Sarl was the only start-up which indicated that they have a dedicated budget for R&D.
It must be said that we tried many models that did not work.”
CEO of Titan.tg
First, feedback from farmers themselves can make us change our business 
model. Number two is also internal evaluations of our performance (…) One 
thing that was helpful was also the internet; we learned the lean start-up 
methodology. We also changed part of our business model after interactions 
with other start-ups during the CTA AgriHack programme in 2016.”
Sera
We do a lot of research and development.”
CEO of Franco Sarl
We met a professional of the irrigation sector; he was the one who told us 
that there was a real interest for our technology in this sector; then we started 
going into this market.”
CEO of Franco Sarl
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Many of  the start-ups seem not to implement this change consciously, because they are young entrepreneurs with 
budding businesses or because their business management capabilities and resources are limited. Business model 
innovation is critical and could be a source of  competitive advantage and higher revenue generation as is well 
apprehended (Foss and Saebi, 2017; Zott et al., 2011). As per the model suggested by Geissdoerfer and his colleagues 
(Geissdoerfer et al., 2018), the start-ups involved in our research have been engaged in the first three phases 
of  business model innovation dubbed start-up, business model transformation and business model diversification. None of  
them has engaged in business model acquisition (certainly because they are youth businesses with limited 
 financial means).
We hypothesise that business models of  most of  the companies are also changing regularly because the ICT4Ag 
sector is still nascent in West Africa. New digital technology, or processes enabled by digitalisation emerge regularly 
(such as the use of  drones in agriculture), and young entrepreneurs who are eagerly and constantly on the lookout 
of  economic opportunities are tempted to shift perspectives and supply services around these new possibilities.
3.2.5. Other observations
We would like to mention that we were interested in identifying if  there was a direct relationship between a specific 
business model and the financial success (in terms of  assured revenue generation and eventually profit) of  a young 
company. However, we could not conclude within this study. For example, the profitable start-ups are not necessarily 
offering the same services (using the same tools), or using the same revenue model, or targeting the same market 
segment (see Table 8). Multiplicities of  factors seem to intervene and this would require further research. 
Another observation is that a couple of  start-ups (Connecticut, Sera, Titan.tg) have identified data management 
(customer data and supply chain data) as a new revenue stream or a business model design element which can 
help them not only better know and serve their customers but also, as relevant, offer new services to other value 
chain players. Data analytics can help in undertaking credit scoring (based on registered farmers’ data) and facilitate 
access to finance for farmers; facilitate index-based insurance for farmers; facilitate food traceability, etc. 
(Maru et al., 2018). Many companies may derive revenues from these services in the future. 
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4. Business success drivers  
and constraints
4.1. Entrepreneurial motivations
Before discussing the concept of  success and success drivers as outlined by the entrepreneurs interviewed, we present 
their motivations to start to the business. 
Motivation is a complex notion that differs from one individual to another and determines the behavioural attributes 
of  an entrepreneur (Carsrud and Brännback, 2011). Our findings show that the motivations for the participants of  
this study starting their businesses varied. It did not necessarily come from studying degree courses in school or from 
receiving formal training and education in computer science or agriculture. Most of  them declared that they have 
been motivated by the need to help farmers find solutions for the difficulties and lack of  revenues they are facing. 
For example, Agromarket, which started in 2016 and is currently operating in three cities in Ghana, mentioned that 
his motivation is: 
Some of  these entrepreneurs have started their businesses based on challenges their parents faced as smallholder 
farmers and have developed means to meet these challenges. AcornTech noted:
These findings on motivation are in line with a research by Santos and colleagues who identified a four-dimensional 
view of  entrepreneurial potential. These are: entrepreneurial motivations, management competencies, psychological 
competencies and social competencies (Santos et al., 2010). A study by Baum et al. (2001) highlighted the importance 
of  entrepreneurial motivation as a great contributor to the success of  a new start-up. There are several factors 
including social and human capital as well as economic factors that influence the decision of  an individual 
to become an entrepreneur (Davidson and Honing, 2003). An article studying the different theories surrounding 
entrepreneurship introduces six theories, including: economic entrepreneurship, psychological entrepreneurship, 
sociological entrepreneurship, anthropological entrepreneurship, opportunity-based entrepreneurship and resource-
based entrepreneurship theories (Simpeh, 2011). These theories help explain the motivation of  entrepreneurs and 
factors that enhance entrepreneurship. 
To help the farmers sell their produce and cut down on losses, and  
also to help consumers get fresh farm produce at their doorsteps.”
My parents are farmers so the initiative started as a result of problems 
they faced when I was growing up. I decided to pursue a career in 
agripreneurship with an insight into ICT as a solution.”
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Economic theory (classical, neoclassical etc.), epitomised by the desire to make a living out of  this engagement, 
appears to be at the basis of  entrepreneurship for all the entrepreneurs interviewed, even though this may 
not be from the beginning of  their businesses. As explained in the literature review, employment challenges faced 
by youth in Africa have forced many of  them to engage in entrepreneurship; this has also led governments 
and international institutions to develop programmes to support them (Dolan and Rajak, 2016). An example of  
a start-up motivated by economic theories (Brice and Nelson, 2008) is FoodRecon:
Similarly, Franco Sarl noted that their motivation for starting the business was the identification of  a gap in 
the market. The CEO stated during the interview that:
Sociological and anthropological theories also explain the motivations of  almost all start-ups interviewed. 
Many of  them wanted to help solve the acute problems faced by farmers who are sometimes their parents. 
For example, AgComm attested that:
Psychological factors, such as the need for personal achievement, have also guided many start-ups.
In general, the business founders showed motivations based on a combination of  more than one theory. 
When facing challenges to transform their business idea into profitable ventures, some of  them pointed 
to the inexistence or lack of  successful role models in this business segment in Africa, which could have further 
motivated them and provided them with insights on profitability avenues. This lack might be due to the novelty 
of  this business segment in West Africa and even at the international level.
Initially, we just notified NGOs working around feeding programmes of 
where they could get nearly expired food supplies. This later morphed into  
a business with a revenue generating model called FoodRecon.”
(…) people often buy 40 hectares or 50 hectares of land and do not know 
what to do about it; hence the development of the business idea.”
(…) the motivation was derived from developing an application to meet  
the Millennium Development Goals, targeting poverty and hunger reduction,  
in the framework of a competition we took part in; although we didn’t win  
the contest, the entrepreneurial idea was born.”
52 Business models and key success drivers of agtech start-ups
4.2. Definition of business success
The definition of  success varies amongst the young entrepreneurs despite some similarities. They defined it both in 
financial and non-financial terms, in line with the literature review. Usually, each of  them named several variables 
as success elements. 
4.2.1. Non-financial indicators
a) Longevity and viability
Three of  the twelve start-ups indicated they define success in terms of  their survival and viability after 3-5 years in 
operation. This approach could be seen as viewing success in terms of  business longevity or survival, which is critical 
for young companies as they have a high failure rate (Fatoki, 2013; Cope, 2011). For Botanica from Benin, success 
will lie in the fact that they would still be in operation after some years. The founder indicated that:
A third entrepreneur, Amber, declared:
By viability, the start-ups meant profitability. However, the definition of  profit was not clear. While some consider 
grants they receive as revenues, others do not, or do it on a case-by-case basis. This would require further research.
b) Offering effective services
Many start-ups defined success in terms of  the effective services they can offer to customers. Agromarket for example 
declared:
We are not yet successful, not yet; after five years if we are still there,  
then we will be successful.”
I think we can say we are successful if after five years we are viable.  
We are in our third year, and we think we will hold on.”
The ambition of the business is to help farmers. We are impacting these  
farmers by selling and cutting down their losses, thereby increasing their  
return on investment on their farming activities. This is success for us.”
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Similarly, success in business for Connecticut is:
This concept of  success is shared by Sera form Ghana and others as well. Sera for example described success as 
being able to offer effective services and products to identified problems faced by farmers with resources available.
c) Achieving planned outputs and results
Another definition of  success not directly linked to finances is the achievement of  planned key performance 
indicators (KPI). In this line of  thought, MobileTrac stated the following:
AcornTech, from Nigeria stated that:
Another company, Hectare stated:
The business is successful as it is now because of the yield we get from  
our farm; therefore, we will be able to deliver on our promise to investors.  
The measure of success is in our yield of production. Currently in Nigeria  
the yield of maize is between 2-3 tonnes of maize but we are getting  
between 5-7 tonnes/hectare with the use of a controlled environment.”
The ability to build a product that people want, delivering on a value that has  
been promised. This is a key instrument that drives the success of our company.”
I would say our business is successful when MobileTrac is being recognised  
as first brand in Ghana and is in contract with 2,455 tractors to help farmers  
in the next three years.”
Success for me is to be able to push our new input package of services, as a 
platform used by 60% of farmers, clear counterfeit goods off the markets and 
help smallholder farmers get access to free insurance.”
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4.2.2. Financial indicators: revenues and profits
Other young entrepreneurs defined success in terms of  their financial performance in relation with revenue 
generation and profit. For the founder of  Franco Sarl from Côte d’Ivoire, success is thus based on profit, the turnover 
that is generated from the business, the growth in the size of  the market and customer satisfaction. Simply put, 
he stipulated:
Similarly, AgComm identified success as the growth in the number of  customers acquired over the years. She noted 
during the interview that:
It has to be noted that no company refers to more specific financial success indicators (for example specific percentage 
of  profit, ROI, or pre-tax return). This might be illustrative of  young profiles of  the companies and of  their level 
of  maturity in financial management.
In my opinion, success is all about financial performance and reputation  
for the company.”
I think we have achieved success because, at the beginning, we were not sure  
that working on the internet with agricultural processors would succeed. But it 
worked; in addition, the number of our customers is increasing every year.”
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4.3. Success drivers of the start-ups
We have identified eight types of  success drivers that we introduce and discuss in the sections below.
Table 9: Key success drivers mentioned by the start-ups










































Total 5 6 5 3 6 3 3 6
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4.3.1. Funding/finance
Funding/finance was identified as a success driver and its lack as a constraint. While its availability was mentioned by 
six companies as success factor, eleven companies referred to its lack as constraint. We will discuss it in the constraints 
section below to avoid repetition.
4.3.2. Adequate team and team management 
Having a capable and committed team is critical according to many start-ups. Amber noted that:
A very positive experience is made by Connecticut to address this staff  issue. They have launched a fellowship 
programme, accessible to young students (from Ghana and beyond) as interns, as well as for skilful international 
young professionals and volunteers interested in supporting a young impactful African company. They sometimes 
pay stipends to those interns or contribute to housing expenditures (not all businesses in Ghana pay stipends 
to interns). The cofounders of  the companies who have developed that strategy are convinced that motivated 
and trained interns may become great staff  or ambassadors, which will help them create a long lasting impactful 
“generational business”.
The founder interviewed declared:
Our expert M.B. added other elements regarding the team:
Other insights are provided in the constraints section below, highlighting staff-related challenges that 
the start-ups faced.
(…) the team is a very good factor that drives the success of the business 
especially if it is dynamic and motivated (…)”
The team makes all the difference (...) That’s my prayers every day, to keep 
attracting the best people and key empowering the best people (...) I want this  
to become a movement (…) It is beyond a one-man thing because no one  
person can build a generational business.”
Resilience, in order to face the many challenges of agtech business for  
young entrepreneurs and openness to the external world are success factors  
co-founders and their teams should develop.”
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4.3.3. Adequate business processes
Establishing sound business processes is critical for business success. Connecticut from Ghana informed that:
Creating sound business systems means as well putting in place effective corporate governance structures, 
particularly a formal management board that operates effectively. We noted that all companies interviewed do not 
have a functioning formal board.
Other start-ups such as Agromarket have been implementing lean management processes (Ries, 2011) and they find 
it very effective. They highlight that young businesses should know how to innovate and identify effective solutions 
immediately as problems appear. According to the founder of  Agromarket, using lean processes by cutting down 
operating costs helps their business achieve success. 
Most young companies do not put systems in place, like an HR system, 
financial system, culture system (...) If you don’t do that you can’t keep  
the best people or attract the best people (...) and you can’t attract  
big capital (…) We don’t talk about that often.”
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4.3.4. Effective solutions and business models
The young entrepreneurs are conscious that developing effective solutions that the farmers and agricultural 
stakeholders are willing to pay for and adopting sound and sustainable business models are very important success 
drivers. 
AcornTech mentioned that having a structured business model will help for the success of  the business:
The importance of  effective business models has been substantively discussed in the previous chapter.
4.3.5. Key partnerships
Key partnership was one of  the most important drivers mentioned by the companies. This can be understood 
as they are young and need support. The importance of  key partners was also discussed in the key partnership 
component of  the business model section in the previous chapter.
4.3.6. Adequate ICT infrastructures and resources
This issue has been raised both as a success driver and as a constraint (its lack), with more emphasis on 
its consideration as a constraint. We will therefore discuss it rather in the constraints section below. 
4.3.7. Adequate agricultural infrastructure and resources
A couple of  companies mentioned that adequate agricultural infrastructure and resources was an important 
success driver. These were companies that rely a lot on these resources to deliver their digital services such 
as Hectare (engaged in actual farming), MobileTrac (facilitating the renting of  tractors) and Botanica (engaged 
in agricultural production).
4.3.8. Brand and reputation
A final success driver mentioned by three start-ups was brand and reputation, as specified by founders of  companies 
such as Franco Sarl and MobileTrac. The latter declared:
Attending a business course has enlightened me with the need of developing  
a well-structured business model, the right systems and structures for the business  
as well as creating a board to assist in decision making processes.”
I would say our business is successful when MobileTrac is being recognised  
as first brand in Ghana.”
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Details on drivers mentioned by the companies are indicated in the table below.
Table 10: Summary table showing the key drivers for success
Company Country     Key drivers for success mentioned (non-exhaustive list per company)
Sera Ghana
• Team
• Good organisational management
• Endorsement and validation from key institutional partners
• Financial viability
Agromarket Ghana
• ICT availability and ICT innovation
• Key partnership
• Running lean processes
Connecticut Ghana
• A great team and talented people
• Money
• Innovation based on experience and knowledge of the sector
• Effective business models
MobileTrac Ghana
• Use of modern tools and ICT-enabled mechanisation
• Brand recognition
• Partnership with tractor owners
Hectare Nigeria
• Adequate agricultural production
• Access to technology
• Access to finance
AcornTech Nigeria • Access to funds• Well-structured business models
FoodRecon Nigeria
• Leveraging technology to keep operational costs as low as possible
• Giving autonomy to employees
• Turning customers into partners
AgComm Senegal
• Having a workable and market-ready solution/effective business models
• The team and its motivation
• Availability of mentors and counsellors
• Finances
Titan	tg Togo
• Courage and determination
• Perseverance
• Collaboration from key partners, notably government and farmers organisations
Amber Burkina Faso
• Team and team motivation
• Training
• Financial support
Botanica Benin • Team (finance, technical and human resources team)• Adequate technical equipment (cold storage for agri-products, computer equipment)
Franco Sarl Côte d’Ivoire
• Professional partners and network
• Collaboration of key public institutions and institutions in charge of agriculture 
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Taking into account insights from entrepreneurs, secondary data and the literature, we understand that the key 
success drivers of  the digital entrepreneurs can be restructured as presented in the graph below.
Figure 9: Key success drivers for the digital agtech start-ups 
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4.4. Constraints faced by the start-ups 
We have identified six major categories of  constraints that we are presenting and will be discussing in the subsequent 
paragraphs.
Table 11: Key constraints of businesses interviewed
Companies Key constraints
Funding/finance Lack of trained, 
committed 
personnel




Lack of ecosystem 
support
















Total 11 4 9 8 6 5
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4.4.1. Lack of finance/funding
While funding was cited as a success driver, its lack was conversely referred to as a constraint common to eleven 
businesses out of  twelve. Agromarket noted that funding has always been a difficult issue in expanding their business, 
although they have received grants from organisations such as CTA and the Tony Elumelu Foundation. Funding 
is needed not only to start the business but also to grow it. Connecticut stated:
However, it has been difficult for the young entrepreneurs to secure loans from banks and other financial institutions 
as in their opinion banks ask for important collaterals or charge very high interest rates which, they argue, they 
cannot afford. According to start-ups, they would pay credit rates between 10 and 30%, the higher rates being 
practised by micro-finance institutions. Whilst some of  the companies have received financial support from NGOs 
and international organisations, winning competitions and awards from reputable organisations such as Rolex, they 
are not optimistic about how banks consider them in the current state of  affairs. As highlighted by Hectare 
of  Nigeria, referring to the ICT for agriculture business, there will always be a “trust issue about their market” when 
they attempt to secure resources from banks.
From another point of  view, many international investors interested in African ventures are able to provide huge 
level investments and try to find businesses that could deserve that level of  amount. Some start-ups, such 
as the founder of  AcornTech, warn that, while funding is necessary, many West African start-ups especially in this 
field do not need for now millions of  dollars. In his words:
It is worth specifying that another company, Connecticut, noted that companies at growth stage do need high 
investment that they are not benefiting from:
We have been fortunate to be one of the first in this line of business  
in West Africa but to excel we need more funds and money.”
Investors should be aware that many companies are not building another  
Facebook or another PayPal. Many start-ups cannot manage or digest  
too large funding.”
Beyond the fifty thousand, hundred thousand and two hundred fifty thousand  
US dollars of awards and grants, when you build a company for several years,  
you need one million, two million dollars (...) You need big money to build  
a big company to do great things well. Very few people are writing these  
cheques for Africans, for young businesses.”
Founder of Connecticut
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Some start-ups are aware that there are some limitations at their own level that cause reluctances of  financial 
institutions, in particular banks, to give them credits. Young agtech start-ups, according to AgComm, have not been 
able to raise finances in Senegal because they do not yet have a mature, profitable business model or because they 
have a weak financial culture. She specified that many start-up founders do not have a good financial background 
or do not understand the language of  venture capitals, which prevents them from accessing funding.
In fact, financial performance has always been a major subject surrounding African small and medium companies 
according to the literature. One of  the hypotheses proposed by Hansen (2016) when studying African enterprise 
performance was that:
The literature also helps to understand why start-ups have challenges to raise capital. A survey of  582 entrepreneurs 
in six Sub-Saharan countries (including Nigeria and Ghana) by the international non-profit organisation Omidyar 
Network revealed that most entrepreneurs fund their companies with personal savings or family loans 
(Omidyar Network, 2013).
Table 12: Source of funding for African companies
(…) financial performance will generally be relatively low among African SMEs 
[small- and medium-sized enterprises] and they will be struggling to grow.”
Source: (Omidyar Network, 2013)  – Based on a survey 
of 582 entrepreneurs from six African countries including 
Ghana and Nigeria
Source: Unpublished report from CTA – Extracts of results 
of a survey of 25 finalists entrepreneurs (coming from various 
countries) of CTA’s Pitch AgriHack West Africa competition 
in 2017
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These observations are in line with some unpublished findings by CTA. In 2017, the organisation surveyed 
the 25 finalists of  its Pitch AgriHack West Africa competition: while 86.96% responded that they fund their ventures 
via personal savings and 39.13% fund them through grants, only 8.7% got funding from banks and 13.04% 
from equity investments. 
Worth mentioning as well is that, according to a publication by the World Bank, many investors do not consider ICT 
as a high return investment sector in many African countries (The World Bank, 2014). At the same time, African 
banks usually shy away from funding the agricultural sector due to its uncertainties (Dalberg Global Development 
Advisors, 2016). Digital agribusiness companies might therefore be facing challenges from those two angles to raise 
capital, the more so as this business sector is novel and seems hardly apprehended by financial institutions. 
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Table 13: Summary table showing the key constraints to success  




• On boarding and retaining farmers more cheaply
• Lack of full support in getting importation licence for vaccines 
• High tax rates
Agromarket Ghana • Not enough bikes for delivery (constraints in the channel of distribution) • Reduction in the production of seasonal produce (e	g	 strawberries)
Connecticut Ghana
• Fund and money to buy vehicles, motorbikes and equipment
• Lack of support from government and public institutions, who could include them in the value    
   chain in the framework of big donor projects
• High taxes
MobileTrac Ghana
• Adoption of technology and internet availability
• Trained tractor operators and availability of tractors
• Access to finance to scale up
• Human resources
Hectare Nigeria
• Trust issues about the market because it is an upcoming company
• Finance and getting funding
• Mentorships in the area of agriculture are difficult to find in Nigeria
• Getting the right tools and mechanisation
• Struggling at the moment with current team regarding technical know-how
AcornTech Nigeria
• Access to business information, knowledge on how to run an agribusiness
• Lack of incubators with knowledge in ICT for agriculture; law specialists 
• Access to grants, funding
• Getting the right team
FoodRecon Nigeria • Talent gap• Access to good capital and finance
AgComm Senegal
• Weak knowledge on ICT4Ag/e-commerce by consumers and government
• Logistics (accuracy of customer addresses during deliveries)  
• Difficulty in defining a business model that supports growth and scaling up
• Low start-up support in AgTech (absence of specialised incubators)   
• Access to finance
Titan	tg Togo
• Excess fees by mobile phone operators
• Lack of cooperation from institutional bodies (state and NGOs)
• Funding and access to finance for scaling up 
Amber Burkina Faso
• Lack of funding and high level of government tax (27%)
• Difficulty to negotiate deals with strategic partners (e	g	, mobile network providers)
• High level of illiteracy amongst the e-commerce customers
Botanica Benin
• Internet connection very bad
• Finance
• Custom taxes; cannot import some equipment easily
Franco Sarl Côte d’Ivoire
• Lack of support for start-ups
• Corporate tax of 25% of profit
• Lack of support from public institutions
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4.4.2. Lack of trained and committed personnel
The availability of  trained and committed staff  was identified as a success driver and discussed above. Its lack has 
been creating constraints for many start-ups.
Indeed, the youth businesses were generally initiated by one or two enthusiast innovators, sometimes when they were 
still completing their university studies. In the first years of  the entrepreneurial venture, they struggled to find 
committed and skilled teams as in most cases the companies do not yet have financial resources or sufficient 
resources. Convincing other young professionals, who at the same time are looking for immediate economic 
opportunities, that the business idea will be eventually fruitful, has therefore been challenging.
admitted the founder of  Titan.tg.
Even after the first couple of  years of  revenues, most businesses do not have enough means to recruit highly relevant 
technical skills. 
Agcomm informed:
I struggled a lot to convince people to join me (…) It has been impossible  
to recruit highly skilled people that we need because we can’t pay them.”
At the beginning you can only pay the minimum for salaries. You do not have 
the means to pay an accountant. You need software engineers, but you cannot 
afford that and thus remain limited in the value you deliver.” 
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4.4.3. Unfavourable policy environment 
This was an important issue as nine out of  twelve companies raised it. Four key sub-items were highlighted: 
high taxation for start-ups, negative political influences, lack of  good governance of  public resources and lack of  
policies favouring better interactions among players in the ICT for agriculture business environment. As a matter 
of  fact, the business climate in West Africa is among the least favourable in the world as illustrated in the 2019 
edition of  the Doing Business Report (World Bank, 2018). In that reference publication of  the World Bank, 14 out 
of  16 West African countries are in the third tier of  performance ranking (190 countries were assessed). 
Table 14: Data excerpted from the Doing Business Report (2019) 












Ghana 114 1st 86 73 115 116 160
Côte 
d’Ivoire 122 2nd 143 44 175 106 80
Cabo 
Verde 131 3rd 155 134 77 45 168
Togo 137 4th 105 144 172 137 86
Senegal 141 5th 127 144 171 142 94
Niger 143 6th 162 144 161 119 114
Mali 145 7th 159 144 165 159 97
Nigeria 146 8th 171 12 157 92 149
Mauritania 148 9th 151 144 178 72 168
Gambia, 
The 149 10th 160 134 169 117 128
Burkina 
Faso 151 11th 181 144 153 165 107
Guinea 152 12th 146 144 181 118 116
Benin 153 13th 176 144 176 171 110
Sierra 
Leone 163 14th 178 161 88 105 161
Liberia 174 15th 172 112 67 175 111
Guinea-
Bissau 175 16th 180 144 154 169 168
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The CEO of  Connecticut noted:
4.4.4. Lack of ecosystem support 
The lack of  ecosystem support has been identified as a four-fold issue in our study:
• Lack of  support from public agricultural players and governments who can facilitate the inclusion of  the young 
entrepreneurs in the agribusiness supply chain (this was also discussed above)
• Lack of  support from competent incubators that can provide effective ICT4Ag mentorship and coaching
• Lack of  support from big agribusinesses players. Sera’s founder, for example, informed about challenges he has 
been facing to collaborate with institutions involved in governing or managing animal health; he believed they 
do not trust them because they are a young business
• Difficulty to collaborate with mobile network operators when start-ups wish to build on their platform to deliver 
services to customers.
Regarding this last point, the founder of  Titan.tg revealed:
This view is seconded by Amber’s CEO who stated that:
The government usually gets grants from IMF, the World Bank, etc.,  
to implement agriculture projects. They do all this often without the start-ups (...) 
Imagine if they collaborate with the start-ups, even in a small way (...)  
I don’t want big money, just include me in the project, in the supply chain.”
(…) the first constraint for me is the mobile operators at home; they ignore your 
business model and impose high rates that we can barely afford (…) this greatly 
impacts negatively our prospects for growth.”
(…) there is the difficulty to negotiate and mobilise key partners including  
mobile networks (…) When we want to use their platform to disseminate 
information via USSD, they claim 80% of the profit, which is not fair.”
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4.4.5. Weak availability and social adoption of ICTs
This issue relates on the one hand to the digital illiteracy among farmers and other agricultural stakeholders and 
on the other hand, to the cost of  technology and the poor digital technology infrastructure in most West African 
countries (weak availability of  broadband connectivity and weak coverage and reliability of  telecommunications, 
especially in rural areas). The internet connectivity situation and challenges faced can be illustrated by figures in 
the table below. 











Benin 11,458,674 3,801,758 33	10% 920,000
Burkina Faso 19,751,651 3,704,265 18	80% 840,000
Cabo Verde 553,335 265,972 48	10% 240,000
Côte d’Ivoire 24,905,843 6,318,355 26	30% 3,800,000
Gambia 2,163,765 392,277 18	10% 310,000
Ghana 29,463,643 10,110,000 34	30% 4,900,000
Guinea 13,052,608 1,602,485 12	30% 1,500,000
Guinea-Bissau 1,907,268 120,000 6	30% 110,000
Liberia 4,853,516 395,063 8	10% 330, 000
Mali 19,107,706 12,480,176 65	30% 1,500,000
Mauritania 4,540,068 810,000 17	80% 770,000
Niger 22,311,375 951,548 4	30% 440,000
Nigeria 195,875,237 98,391,456 50	20% 17,000,000
Senegal 16,294,270 9,749,527 59	80% 2,900,000
Sierra Leone 7,719,729 902,462 11	70% 450,000
Togo 7,990,926 899,956 11	30% 560,000
Average for West 
Africa 26.61%
TOTAL AFRICA 1,287,914,329 453,329,534 35,20% 177,005,700
Europe 827,650,849 704,833,752 85,20% 340,891,620
WORLD TOTAL 7,634,758,428 4,156,932,140 54,40% 2,119,060,152
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This table shows that end 2017, West African countries had an average internet penetration of  26.61%, while 
this statistic stood at 85.20% for Europe (Miniwatts Marketing Group, 2018). The situation is worse in rural areas 
(Chick et al., 2010) where farmers in particular reside. Electric power supply is also erratic. These poor technological 
environments do not favour the development of  a customer base for the young digital companies, as noted 
by Agcomm.
4.4.6. Business model challenges
Business model design has been substantively discussed in the previous chapter. Many start-ups informed that they 
are still facing challenges to design effective business models. Usually they lack support in that domain and regret 
particularly the lack of  specialised incubators and accelerators or knowledgeable mentors. This lack might be 
due to the nascent character of  the digital agribusiness sub-sector in West Africa.
The business climate factors (government policies/legislation, politics, etc.) may play a vital role in the continued 
existence or success of  a new business (Simpeh, 2011). For example, although the Ghanaian government has 
introduced a holiday tax for start-ups within the first three years of  operation (Entsie, 2018), some Ghanaian 
start-ups interviewed mentioned that there is lack of  clarity on conditions of  benefits of  this opportunity and some 
are thus still paying these taxes.
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5. Conclusions & Recommendations
5.1. Conclusions
5.1.1. Key findings
This study sets out to study the drivers of  business success for young digital start-ups targeting the agro-food sector 
in West Africa. Business success is considered here as the offer of  effective services to the targeted customers, 
resulting in accumulation of  sales, profits and continued business operation. Also as discussed in the literature review 
section, we considered success both from a financial and non-financial indicator point of  view. We focused our 
research on West Africa, one of  the African regions in which the agro-food sector is prominent but where little 
research on this topic has been carried out so far. We targeted start-ups led by young entrepreneurs aged between 
18 and 35 years old, the youth age range as defined by ECOWAS and the African Union.
We identified three main research questions at the beginning of  this study.
Due to limitations in timeframe, we undertook an inductive interpretative research, with analysis of  case studies. 
Our sampling technique followed the purposive sampling proposed by Saunders et al. (2009). It was composed 
of  twelve start-ups coming from six West African countries (successful winners or finalists of  international 
competitions). We collected primary data through interviews. We also had access to some secondary data on 
the interviewees collected by CTA, an international organisation that identified the start-ups. This gave us more 
information about the twelve participants before the scheduled interview. 
To investigate the first research question, an adapted version of  the BMC model developed by Osterwalder and 
Pigneur (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010) was used. Nine components of  the business operations of  the companies 
have thus been investigated: problem addressed, activities/services, customer segments, value proposition, channels, 
revenue streams, key resources, cost structure, key partnerships. The companies operate different business models. 
The main problems they strive to address are the lack of  advisory services, the weak agricultural productivity, as well 
as the lack of  access to profitable markets in the region. Some of  them are addressing the weak customer data and 
supply chain management issues, the limited access to quality agro-food products, or animal and post-harvest losses. 
They are thus offering a variety of  services including agricultural advisory services (via mobile phone or voice 
server), market linkage services (facilitation of  purchase of  agricultural inputs, sale of  agro-food product via 
e-commerce platforms, etc.), agricultural production machinery services (use of  drones, tractor leasing, etc.), 
in different agriculture sub-sectors (crop and animal production mainly). Most of  them offer at least two services, 
including sometimes general services such as ICT training of  agricultural actors. They supply services to various 
agricultural customer segments, from young farmers to more mature farmers, farmer organisations, governments, 
agro-dealers, etc. Most of  them are thus servicing simultaneously businesses and directly the customers. Revenues 
are made via assets sales, usage or licensing fees. Most companies are value-driven and seem not to be cost-driven 
just because competition is generally weak in their business segment. 
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Regarding the second research question, some of  our main findings are as follows. Revenues for digital services are 
not generated from the individual farmer but from supporting organisations, the value chain and donors. Farmers 
are either not willing or unable to pay for the services: sometimes they do not see its value, sometimes because 
of  digital illiteracy or they claim that they do not have the resources to pay for them. Thus, many of  the companies 
studied struggled in the first years of  their operations to generate revenues when they mainly target individual 
farmers. They have eventually understood that targeting institutions was a better strategy to generate revenues and 
achieve profitability (which eight out of  twelve start-ups have reached). 
Success also depends on offering multiple and bundled services; more particularly, it has appeared that start-ups 
have to integrate digital and non-digital agricultural services, in order to become a value chain player. Some of  them 
have therefore understood that focusing on digital has been a bad strategy and they are increasingly offering 
a variety of  services to address various needs of  the farmers and agricultural stakeholders. This approach is yielding 
benefits and is recommended by D.A., one of  our experts. Data-driven services are emerging and can also yield 
important values.
Partly due to the immaturity of  their model and a lack of  experience in business management, unplanned business 
model innovation occurs. We also noted that owners with an agricultural background are increasingly getting 
involved in digital agribusiness services, which seems to lead to increased effectiveness in services offered.
We have identified eight main drivers that help to achieve success, including: availability of  funding, adequate team 
and team management, key partnerships, adequate ICT and agricultural infrastructure and resources, effective 
solutions and business models, effective business systems and processes and brand/reputation. 
The policy environment is generally not very enabling for the young entrepreneurs, high taxes being important 
constraints. However, the lack of  access to funding is the major challenge they face. They also struggle to find or pay 
for committed and qualified staff  and to interact with key institutional players including mobile network operators. 
5.1.2. Limitations
This research was started in September 2018 with the interviews taking up roughly five weeks of  the time due 
to postponements and the festive period. More time needs to be invested in this type of  research to cover a large 
number of  participants, at national or regional level, if  generalisation of  findings is an objective. Our sample is not 
representative; it covers only seven countries in West Africa out of  sixteen. In each country, it was not possible 
to define or identify the most successful digital agripreneur to interview them. We have not covered two agricultural 
sub-sectors (forestry and fisheries). One entrepreneur serving the fisheries sector that we identified was not available 
to join the project. We acknowledge therefore that our findings cannot be generalised to all digital agripreneurs 
in West Africa.
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5.1.3. Future work 
It will be useful to further investigate our finding that in most cases, individual farmers do not pay for the digital 
services and that institutions (including farmer cooperatives) actually pay for farmers. The configuration, functioning 
and effectiveness of  these relationships could be studied. It would also be useful to further investigate the relationship 
between business models and profitability for the young start-ups. We could not conclude on this issue in this 
research. We however noticed for example that certain types of  services have helped companies generate more 
easily revenues (which is important for young entrepreneurs). 
These include:
• services that provide immediate and visible outputs for farmers and agricultural stakeholders (such as drone 
services offered by Franco Sarl and market linkages services offered by Agromarket, Agcomm and Connecticut), 
especially when there is little or no competition
• traditional agricultural services that just leverage digital technologies to be supplied such as inputs delivery 
services offered by Connecticut.
Conversely, services that deliver exclusively information (such as advisory information) face more challenges. 
The business environment, including the actual capabilities of  the companies to offer those services also influence 
financial success as implied in the business success and constraints chapter. More research will be necessary on 
these hypotheses. 
This is a new area of  study, therefore future work could be done using both qualitative and quantitative techniques 
across a wider range of  participants for a more holistic view. Specific research could focus on precise services, such 
as drone operations, agro e-commerce trade, etc.
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5.2. Recommendations
The recommendations we propose are based on our understanding of  issues confronted by these young 
entrepreneurs and their businesses, key insights from the literature review and our interviews with two experts. 
They are addressed to the young entrepreneurs themselves, governments, national ecosystem actors as well as 
to international organisations supporting digital agripreneurship.
5.2.1. Promoting role models to enhance motivation
All the participants interviewed expressed their motivation for starting their businesses, showing generally 
a combination of  reasons. Some have also pointed the lack of  successful digital agribusiness role models 
in West Africa, which could have further inspired them. The impact of  having role models, who could even act 
as mentors for young entrepreneurs, cannot be over-emphasised (Clutterbuck, 2004). This is particularly important 
in the agricultural sector in African countries. Indeed, the sector has a negative image and young people usually shy 
away from it (AGRA, 2015). Digitalisation, which has a better image than agriculture, provides a good opportunity 
to build on role models to encourage youth to innovate for the sector and capture economic opportunities (CTA(a), 
2016). Cull proposed that having a role model in business or a mentor-client relationship has a positive impact 
in creating success for young entrepreneurs irrespective of  the business sector (Cull, 2006). Factors that create 
success in the mentoring process as indicated by Hall (2003) include: proper matching of  mentors to youth 
entrepreneurs, continuous training and regularity of  contact. Similarly, a more recent study looking at the interaction 
between role models and entrepreneurial intentions indicated the importance of  having a role model pre-start-up 
and post-start-up (Bosma et al., 2012). 
We therefore recommend promoting promising or successful digital agribusiness entrepreneurs who can inspire 
other young entrepreneurs. 
5.2.2. Facilitating access to funding
Almost all companies interviewed cited weak access to funding as a barrier to business launch and growth. 
To overcome this undermining challenge, there is a crucial need for substantial support from the government, 
investors and other institutions. While early-stage or pre-revenue start-ups need mostly start-up financing, many 
entrepreneurs such as those interviewed need rather growth financing. The lack of  growth financing can maintain 
them in the “death valley” where they stagnate before eventually dying. 
Governments and relevant stakeholders can encourage banks to provide loans at better rates and if  needed, develop 
de-risking schemes that can motivate these service providers to fund youth. Governments are in addition requested 
to either put in place innovation funds for digital agribusinesses or to plan relevant benefits for digital agribusiness 
when those funds exist. Moreover, improved governance should be at the foundation of  the management of  these 
funds, and adequate follow-up with winning entrepreneurs ensured. 
There is also need of  more African investors and private businesses that can fund entrepreneurs. 
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Agricultural and other development organisations often provide grants to young entrepreneurs. As recommended 
by many entrepreneurs, these organisations should not put too many constraints on conditions of  access 
to these funds. 
Finally, it is capital to remember that, as revealed by the report by the Omidyar Network, while many entrepreneurs 
claim that they lack access to funding, many investors or supporting institutions consider that many young businesses 
are not sustainable (Omidyar Network, 2013) and that the entrepreneurs have a strong deficit in accounting and 
financial management. This implies that entrepreneurs need to improve their investment readiness capabilities. 
Governments as well as organisations that have interest in them should support them in this area.
5.2.3. Ensuring effective digital agribusiness management
Digital agripreneurship requires acumen in at least three domains: agriculture, digital technology and business 
management. Gaps in at least one of  these areas have effected most of  the young entrepreneurs studied. 
Young software developers usually lack knowledge of  the agricultural sector (Baumüller, 2016; Baumüller 
and Lohento, 2016), while young business owners with an agricultural background lack understanding of  digital 
technologies. Business management capacity is limited at the level of  many young entrepreneurs. One of  the experts 
that we interviewed, D.A, stated that many young software developers investing digital agricultural service provision 
hardly know the agricultural sector and design ineffective solutions. Founders of  digital agribusinesses need therefore 
to ensure that either they have good capacity in these areas and/or recruit team members with adequate capacity. 
They should also facilitate capacity development for their staff  when needed in these areas. Gaps that need 
to be addressed include accounting and financial management literacy.
Many products that are developed currently lack innovations and value add, which hindrances their success. 
For example, too many agro-e-commerce platforms are launched in the same market, using basic existing plug-ins 
with no customised algorithms, which could help generate a comparative advantage.
Lean management and lean start-up technics (Ries, 2011) need to be better adopted by the businesses. Among 
others, young companies should adopt systematically the “Build-Measure-Learn” feedback loop principle in service 
design, avoid focusing on vanity metrics (Ries, 2011).
One channel through which the needed capacities can be acquired is the educational system. But these institutions 
are criticised for not adequately preparing students for entry in the job market (Baumüller, 2016). University training 
curricula should then be updated to include industry hands-on knowledge. Agricultural faculties should include 
some digital agribusiness knowledge in their curricula, while computer schools and universities should create 
thematic specialities, such as digital agribusiness, which can be embraced by software developers.
Another capacity building channel that should be developed is collaboration between agripreneurs, at national level 
(e.g. Yeesal Agrihub in Senegal) and regional level (e.g. the AfricaGoesDigital involving drone operators). 
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Technology hubs, incubators or accelerators can facilitate capacity building of  young entrepreneurs (Jiménez 
and Zheng, 2018; Littlewooda and Wilkister, 2018; Talbot, 2012). However, there is lack of  specialised capacity 
in these institutions as well. As indicated by our second expert, M.B., responsible of  an incubator, these institutions 
are getting better organised, under the leadership of  their organisation AfriLab. It will be useful that governments 
and development stakeholders support these organisations to acquire digital agribusiness capacity and facilitate 
as well collaboration between digital and agricultural incubators. 
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5.2.4. Promoting an enabling business environment 
While many West African governments depend on fiscal revenues, young entrepreneurs recommend that they create 
a fiscal environment more supportive of  youth entrepreneurs. The example of  Ghana, which has instituted a tax 
holiday for young businesses, can serve as model. In some countries, even when incentives exist, there is lack 
of  transparency and information on their conditions of  access as noted by Sera. Public authorities should thus avoid 
leaving the impression that political acquaintance is a key criterion for benefiting from these incentives. 
Establishing public-private-partnerships involving effective young digital businesses is another avenue to enable their 
growth. Titan.tg and our expert D.A. encourage governments to involve the national private sector in their projects. 
Many entrepreneurs recommend that policies should be put in place to guarantee that no player unfairly exploits 
their dominant position. Sometimes, local businesses feel that they face unfair competition when competing with 
the foreign organisations operational in West African countries. Governments are encouraged to enable favourable 
frameworks for negotiation between mobile network operators (which can provide much value to entrepreneurs) 
and the young companies. There is also a fear that ownership of  the most promising young digital companies might 
be captured eventually by international investors and businesses. Governments should consider these elements 
as well in their policy strategies.
Easing the protection of  digital innovations of  young innovators is also crucially needed. Finally, young entrepreneurs 
should learn how to better collaborate with all ecosystem players, including by remaining conscious of  the values 
and needs of  these stakeholders.
5.2.5. Designing innovative and effective business models
Weaknesses in business model innovations and the central importance of  a business model as a success factor have 
been largely discussed in previous sections. Practices that have proven more successful include bundling services 
(for example advisory services and market linkages services), becoming a value chain player by bundling if  
appropriate, non-digital and digital agricultural services. Designing B2B or B2B2C services (business-to-business-to-
customer services) appears a good strategy to generate revenues, as individual farmers usually are not in 
a position or willing to pay for digital agro information services (Baumüller, 2016; AGRA, 2016). Data analytics and 
data-driven services have emerged as strong value capture channels (Loshin and Reifer, 2013; CTA, 2018) 
and entrepreneurs should learn to develop digital agribusiness services that leverage data while protecting customers’ 
data. A revenue model that has proven its effectiveness for some start-ups is the subscription model, though customers 
adopt it only if  the company offers reliable services. 
Services need to be designed taking into account customers’ needs and environment. Thus, young innovators should 
not develop, for example, a solution based on smartphones for farmers they target if  they do not own smartphones 
or cannot afford bandwidth costs.
Institutions supporting youth development should also continuously assist digital agripreneurs to raise their capacities 
in business modelling.
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5.2.6. Developing team commitment and retention 
Many entrepreneurs mentioned to have faced uncommitted staff, leading sometimes to loss of  capabilities. 
An option experimented successfully by Connecticut to enhance employee engagement is to create a strong sense 
of  belonging and ownership of  the firm. Means of  achievement of  this include providing public acknowledgement 
and effective visibility opportunities to the staff, while providing them with capacity building options and even equity 
when relevant. As the young start-ups are challenged by limited financial returns, leveraging non-monetary and 
intrinsic rewards can yield commitment. 
5.2.7. Improving the digital infrastructure and agricultural 
digitalisation
The most important constraint that digital entrepreneurship faces might be the weak digitalisation of  the agricultural 
sector, especially farmers’ digital illiteracy and the poor rural connectivity, despite progress achieved (Acker, 2011; 
Baumüller, 2015; Kabbiria et al., 2018). This weakness is a strong impediment for the development of  the market 
that digital entrepreneurs want to serve. There is also a weak understanding of  digitalisation opportunities at 
the level of  other agricultural stakeholders, including public actors who can support youth. 
While connectivity is progressing in Africa in general, rural areas where most farmers reside are still lagging behind 
(Chick et al., 2010; GSMA, 2018).
Therefore, governments and telecom operators should accelerate strategies aiming at boosting broadband 
connectivity, rural connectivity and affordability of  digital tools. We also advise that e-agriculture strategies are 
developed or adequately implemented, at national and regional levels. Capacities of  all agricultural stakeholders 
should finally be raised and effective use cases promoted.
79Conclusions & Recommendations
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